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Individual Responsibility
Under a Disarmament
Agreement in American Law
Enforcement of individual compliance with a nation's
treaty obligations is normally the sole responsibility of
the nation having jurisdiction over the particular individual. However, any proposal for international disarmament, hopeful of gaining acceptance by the world,
will likely have to provide greater guarantees of compliance by individuals than enforcement subject to the
changing moods of national governments would ensure.
In the United States any extra-national enforcement or
rulemaking authority regulating citizens, even though
accomplished through existing national institutions,may
raise substantial constitutional questions. This article
concludes that the present constitutional framework
quite possibly allows participation in such a disarmament agreement, but recommends that in several respects the Constitution should be amended to remove
doubt as to the authority of the United States in this
area.

Daniel G. Partan*
This report is primarily concerned with the legal and constitutional problems that are presented by alternative methods of
translating the international law obligations of a disarmament
agreement into domestic law applicable to the activities of persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. It is necessary first, however, to place the question discussed in context by
means of some more general comments.
I. INTRODUCTION
One major barrier to the achievement of a general and complete disarmament agreement has been our inability to foresee
*Research Associate, Rule of Law Research Center, Duke University, and
Associate Professor of Law, University of North Dakota.
This study was supported by a research grant made to the Rule of Law
Research Center by the Institute for International Order.
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in any concrete sense the extent to which the agreement will
prove possible of enforcement, and to assess the dangers that
are likely to be presented if enforcement fails. Several factors
contribute to uncertainty as to the enforcement potential of a
disarmament agreement. First, we do not yet have an adequate
picture of the type of sanctions or of enforcement machinery
that is likely to form part of the agreement.' Second, we are not
able to judge the extent to which human ingenuity will be able
to circumvent any conceivable or politically possible enforcement mechanism. Finally, and no doubt most important, the
major official disarmament proposals offer no clear practical or
theoretical concept of the ways in which international society is
likely to change either as a precondition for or as a result of
general and complete disarmament.2 For example, disarmament
1. The official disarmament proposals advanced by the Soviet Union and
by the United States in 1962, as amended through March 1, 1964, have been
published by the World Law Fund in CURRENT DISARAMIENT PROPOSALS
(preliminary ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as CURRENT DISARLAMENT PROPOSALs]. References in this report to the "Soviet Plan" mean the Soviet "Draft
Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament Under Strict International
Control," id. at 1-28, and to the "United States Plan" mean the United
States "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete
Disarmament in a Peaceful World," id. at 29-59.
One example of lack of clarity as to enforcement machinery is article 40
of the Soviet Plan which provides that the International Disarmament
Organization (IDO) "shall deal with questions pertaining to the supervision of
compliance by States with their obligations under the present Treaty," but
that all questions "connected with the safeguarding of international peace
and security .

. . ,

including preventive and enforcement measures, shall be

decided by the Security Council in conformity with its powers under the
United Nations Charter," which apparently means that the veto would apply
to enforcement measures. Id. at 25. Under the United States Plan, stage I,
part G, paragraph 6(b), the Control Council of the IDO would adopt "rules
for implementing the terms of the Treaty," but no specific enforcement
powers are proposed. Id. at 42. Stage I, part H, paragraph 5(c), of the United
States Plan calls for conclusion of an agreement for the establishment of a
United Nations Peace Force in stage II, which would include "definitions
of its purpose, mission, composition and strength, disposition, command and
control . . .

,"

all open questions under the present United States proposals.

Id. at 44.
2. The United States Plan, being only an "Outline of Basic Provisions,"
does not cover all of the areas that may be thought necessary in a treaty
establishing the legal framework for a disarmed world. A more thorough
presentation is the Clark & Sohn, Draft of a Treaty Establishing a World
Disarmament and World Development Organization Within the Framework
of the United Nations, in id. at 61-178 [hereinafter referred to as the Clark
and Sohn proposals]. See also CLARK & Sons, WonRL PEACE THROUGH WORLD
(Larson ed. 1963),
LAw at xv-xlii (2d ed. 1960); and A WARLESS WoRL
discussing the problems and opportunities of a disarmed world under law.
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will most probably be accompanied by vigorous and comprehensive peaceful settlement procedures, by some form of international or supranational legislative authority, and by some form
of international force possessing sufficient armed forces and armaments so that its rule could not be challenged militarily. We
have little or no guidance, however, on the precise character of
the likely developments in any of these areas, and yet, as uncertain as we are, we must still deal in a meaningful way with
the major unanswered question, "How will these factors affect
the structure of the international community in a disarmed
world?"
Each of the uncertainty factors mentioned above has a great
bearing on possible alternative blueprints for the role of the
individual under general and complete disarmament. If, for example, disarmament obligations are to be directed only to
governments, as seems to be the present intention, presumably
individual conduct will be regulated by the national government
concerned. Will this suffice to ensure compliance in normal government-to-government relations, or will individuals be pressed
into international service, as it were, to ensure that their
governments faithfully implement the agreement? Will the end
result of imposing even this measure of compliance responsibility
on individuals be a transfer of individual loyalties from national
governments to some form of "world government"? In choosing
to place obligations to achieve or to maintain warlessness in the
disarmed world order directly on individuals as well as on their
governments, some judgment must be made as to the impact of
such a process on the continued vitality of the nation-state system as we know it today.3
The general and complete disarmament proposals advanced
by the United States and by the Soviet Union envisage the
continuance of the nation-state system. As to individual respon3. The Clark and Sohn proposals would give the General Conference of
the World Disarmament and World Development Organization power to
adopt regulations binding on all member states to enforce disarmament, to
control nuclear energy and the use of outer space, and to define "what acts
or omissions of individuals or private organizations . . . shall be deemed
violations of this Treaty for which such individuals or organizations shall be
held personally responsible . . . ." Arts. 7-8, CURRENT DIsAnRNaLENT PROPosALs 68-69. See also article 66, providing for the establishment of United
Nations regional courts and the appointment of an Attorney-General of the
United Nations whose function would be to prosecute individuals and
private organizations accused of offenses against the Treaty. Id. at 197. The
same article provides for a "United Nations civil police force" which would
investigate offenses and apprehend accused individuals. Id. at 129.
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sibility, neither set of proposals offers any explicit change in
the present system, in which individuals are represented at the
world level by their national governments, and in which the
responsibilities of the individual with regard to disarmament
norms would be channeled through national governments. The
United States Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General
and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World,4 for example,
provides in stage II for the enactment by each party of national
legislation to impose legal obligations on individuals subject to
the jurisdiction of that party to comply with disarmament measures adopted by states at the international level. The Soviet
Draft Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament Under
Strict InternationalControl' contains an apparently similar provision in its article 2 "Control Obligation" on states parties
"to ensure the implementation in their territories of all control
measures" set forth in the treaty. Although in each draft proposal it therefore seems to be considered that it will be necessary
to take steps to ensure that individuals comply with the obligations of the disarmament agreement, neither draft goes beyond
traditional national enforcement to propose some form of international or supranational control over the actions of individuals.
Would national control over individual action suffice? It
might be argued that national enforcement would mean nothing
4. The United States Plan contains a general provision on "National
Legislation" in stage II, part G, paragraph 5, which reads as follows:
Those Parties to the Treaty which had not already done so would,
in accordance with their constitutional processes, enact national legislation in support of the Treaty imposing legal obligations on individuals
and organizations under their jurisdiction and providing appropriate
penalties for noncompliance.
CumEir DIsARmamma PROPOSALs at 51.
5. Soviet Plan, art. 2, para. 1, id. at 3. In one instance the Soviet Plan
clearly calls for national legislation making specified acts criminal. Article
22 (8) of the Soviet Plan provides that each party shall, "in accordance with
its constitutional procedures, enact legislation completely prohibiting nuclear
weapons and making any attempt by individuals or organizations to reconstitute such weapons a criminal offence." Id. at 16. Article 34 requires the
parties to "enact legislation prohibiting all military training," but does not
specify that "military training" engaged in by individuals shall be a criminal
offense punishable under national law. Id. at 21-22. Articles 9(8) and 10(3)
provide that the parties "shall enact legislation and issue regulations to
ensure that no military bases to be used by foreign troops are established in
their territory," which laws and regulations shall also prohibit citizens "from
serving in the armed forces or from engaging in any other activities serving
military purposes in foreign States." Id. at 8-9. Like article 2(1), these
articles do not make entirely clear that the treaty obligations shall be implemented by national laws making the prohibited acts criminal.
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more than control of such individual action as is contrary to
national policy, where national policy may or may not be in
conformity with the requirements of the disarmament agreement.o In other words, if national governments are likely to be
prepared to sanction activity in violation of the norms contained
in the disarmament agreement, some might question whether
the system of national enforcement would supply adequate assurance of compliance with the disarmament agreement, and
conclude that the only workable alternative is some form of international enforcement directly applicable to individual action.
The answer to this question may depend upon the degree to
which it is possible to visualize independent action by various
branches within a national government. If, for example, a national legislature would be prepared to violate the disarmament
agreement, might the executive stand in the way? Or, would the
judiciary be able to act to carry out the policy of a disarmament
agreement where the executive or the legislature had become
less than enthusiastic about implementation? In view of the
differences between national governments both in structure and
in the degree to which it is reasonable to expect different branches
of a particular government to be capable of holding different
views on matters of high national importance, it is likely that
differing assessments of the efficacy of national enforcement
would be made for each national context.7 In addition, the uncertainty of such an assessment is compounded by our inability
to foresee even in broad outline the extent to which the assessment would be affected by changes in the national and international system brought about by the disarmament agreement.
A national government need not forever be regarded as a
monolithic structure capable of taking only one view of a particular situation. In any normally functioning national society as
we conceive of it today, no doubt it would not be expected that
any branch of the government would faithfully comply with
the strictures of a disarmament agreement much beyond the
point at which that agreement had lost its support in public
6. See HMNKIN, ARi s CONTROL AND INSPECTION IN AMERICAN LAW 123
(1958), quoted in text accompanying notes 15-16 infra.
7. Testing the efficacy of national enforcement schemes in particular
national contexts would require a thorough understanding of the national
legal system and of the ways in which law is brought to bear on individual
action within that system. All facets of national enforcement would not
necessarily be workable in each system, however. For example, if the national
courts are to be relied upon to issue injunctions, etc., that may run counter
to the short-run interests of the national government in power, such a system
would not work unless the courts are reasonably independent of the executive.
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opinion as a result, for example, of perceived significant and
threatening violations on the other side." Such extreme situations
excepted, however, even today it should not be inconceivable
to expect honest and effective disagreements to exist within a
national government on the proper course to follow in a particular context. In the United States, for example, unless a
measure has overwhelming popular support, either the President
or the Congress is usually able to block its adoption. Disagreement within the government is usually more effective where inaction rather than action is the sought end, however.' In the
disarmament context, therefore, a distinction might be drawn
between the effectiveness of dissent when the object of the dissenters is to oppose threatened affirmative action that would
violate the disarmament agreement, and the effectiveness of dissent when the object of the dissenters is to induce the government to take some action required by the agreement or to halt
conduct carried on in apparent violation of the agreement. It
may be easier to prevent government action than it would be to
induce a government to act.
These considerations have peculiar application to the problem
of securing individual compliance with the norms established by
the disarmament agreement. To take one example, if it is envisaged in the disarmament agreement that its application to
individual activity would be by national legislation, it would no
doubt also be provided that the required national legislation
must have been enacted prior to completion of the disarmament
process so that the ground rules are set before all arms have
been destroyed. Assuming that adequate legislation has been
adopted at the outset, however, might the legislature change the
8. The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in
Outer Space and Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, art. IV, [1963] 9 U.S.T. & O.I.A.
1319, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, for example, provides that in the exercise of its
"national sovereignty," each party has "the right to withdraw from the
Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter
of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country." CURRENT
DisARmAMENT PRoPosALs 194. [Emphasis added.] This clause clarifies the
situation where a violation is perceived but cannot be proved, but does not
replace the usual international law right of a state to avoid a treaty that has
been breached by the other party. See Opinion of the Legal Adviser, in
Hearings on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Before the Senate Committee on
ForeignRelations, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 37-40 (1963).
9. One example is the constitutional barrier to exercise of the treaty power,
requiring that treaties have the "Advice and Consent" of "two thirds of the
Senators present . . . ." U. S. CoNsT. art. II § 2. Another example is the
difficulties facing the Department of Defense in its effort to close $500
million worth of obsolete defense installations.
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national law in the future, thereby placing the state in violation
of the agreement? As a matter of domestic law, would the executive or the courts have power to override the new legislation in
order to carry out the disarmament agreement? Or, if the executive should decline to enforce the national implementing legislation, does national law permit the legislature or the courts
to override executive inaction? Or, if the courts should prove a
stumbling block to enforcement of national implementing legislation, to what extent might the other branches of the national
government take independent action to apply such legislation
to individual conduct?o
Each of these questions normally turns on national law, and
it is therefore of primary importance to measure the capacity of
each relevant national legal system to permit effective expression
of dissenting views supporting compliance with the disarmament
agreement. One must also consider the extent to which it would
be either possible or desirable to provide answers to these questions in the disarmament agreement. If as to any particular
state it should appear that the national legal framework might
be inadequate to assure full play for effective expression of
dissenting views, national enforcement of individual responsibilities under a disarmament agreement might not be regarded
as adequate to ensure compliance. The further question is then
reached of the extent to which the particular inadequacies of a
particular national legal system might be dealt with in the disarmament agreement by, for example, providing for constitutional amendments so changing the structure of the national
government as to enable dissent to be effective. If changes of
this nature cannot be brought about by the agreement, and if
enforcement against individuals is regarded as essential, then it
would appear that the only alternative is some form of international enforcement machinery to supplement enforcement by
national action.
This report is confined to a consideration of the first two
questions, namely the extent to which national enforcement of
individual responsibilities might be effective within the United
States, and the extent to which the inadequacies found might be
remedied by appropriate national action provided for in the
disarmament agreement. The question of international enforcement machinery is not considered, and, it must be emphasized,
even the first two problems are taken up only in the United
10. The problem of legislative nullification of the domestic effect of a
disarmament agreement is discussed in part IV infra.
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States context. Before national enforcement should be relied
upon as adequate on a world scale, similar studies must be made
of the legal systems of every other relevant state.
II. THE REALITY OF INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY
Not too many years ago, international law was thought of as
applying almost solely to the affairs of states. States were regarded as the subjects of international law; international organizations with independent "personalities" were of little significance, and individuals fell within the ambit of international law
only on such rare occasions as when they were accused of piracy
or of assault upon an ambassador. Two world wars and increased
interdependence among states destroyed the basis for this ancient
learning. International organizations, chief among them being the
United Nations, are today commonly endowed by their creators
with "international personality," that is, with a capacity to act
as entities apart from their constituent states. Subsequent to the
Second World War, individuals were held accountable under international law for war crimes, crimes against peace, and crimes
against humanity. Individuals and private business associations
have also sometimes been given access to international tribunals
in controversies arising under international agreements." Finally,
a great movement is under way in the United Nations and elsewhere to secure international protection of individual human
rights under international law standards laid down and enforced
by action of international organizations. 2
Increased recognition of the individual as a proper subject of
rights and duties under international law has not extended to
official disarmament proposals, however. As has been noted, with
regard to individual responsibility both the Soviet and the United
States proposals seem to adopt the approach of limiting enforcement as to individuals to national action against individuals
11. One example is the Court of Justice of the European Communities.
Private parties (persons and business associations) may appeal directly to
the court to contest decisions of the executive authorities of the three communities. See, e.g., Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, April 18, 1951, art. s, 261 U.N.T.S. 140, 167; Treaty Establishing
the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, art. 173, 298 U.N.T.S.
11, 75-76 (English text).
12. See, e.g., the (European) Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 218 U.N.T.S. 221; and the
substantive articles of the United Nations Draft International Covenants
on Human Rights adopted by the Third Committee of the General Assembly
from 1955 through 1963, U.N. Doc. No. A/5705 (1964).
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whose acts violate national law, and thereby conflict with national
government policy. There is no provision in either plan for international criminal laws having direct application to individuals
or for an international criminal court in which individuals may
be brought to trial for engaging in activities prohibited by the
disarmament agreement. The national legislation referred to in
each plan may be argued to reach only individual action that runs
counter to government policy. Responses to the initiation or the
implementation of government policies allegedly contrary to the
disarmament agreement are left to the arena of disputes between
states and to the mechanisms contained in the draft proposals
for the settlement of disputes between the states parties to the
agreement, possibly culminating in international adjudication and
international enforcement action by some international agency.' 3
The question of establishing an international tribunal for the
trial of individuals charged with violation of a disarmament agreement is not discussed in this report, but it is treated extensively
by Louis Henkin in Arms Control and Inspection in American
Law (1958). Henkin's view, which is borne out by recent official
proposals, is that arms control plans are unlikely to rely on international enforcement against individual violators. Serious violations might be declared "war crimes" and national leaders might
be brought to trial on such charges in an international court, but
that is likely to happen only after military defeat at the hands
of the world community, possibly acting through the United
Nations or through an International Disarmament Organization.14
As regards enforcement of individual responsibility by national action under national legislation, Henkin observes:
The individual violating arms control for private purposes contrary to
the wishes of his government would be tried by his government in its
own courts. The violations of arms control which would be of most
serious international concern -government
circumvention or violation
of treaty obligations-would also involve individuals, official or private. These individuals, of course, would not be tried and punished by
their government.' 5

Relating this comment to the situation within the United States,
Henkin points out that, as no doubt will be required by the disarmament agreement, an individual subject to United States
13. The United States proposal for the conclusion of an agreement establishing a United Nations Peace Force is quoted in note 1 supra. The Soviet
enforcement proposals are also quoted in note 1 supra.
14. HENKIN, op. cit. supra note 6, at 122-23.
15. Id. at 123.
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jurisdiction who acts on his own in violation of disarmament rules
would be treated by United States authorities as a violator of
United States law. But, writes Henkin, if an individual acts in
collusion with United States authorities, "he would hardly be
prosecuted, even though arms control might still remain officially
part of the nation's criminal law."" Henkin continues in part as
follows:
The purposes of the criminal law -whether prevention, or deterrence,
or rehabilitation, or even a measure of retribution -are not relevant in
those circumstances, and would not be served by punishment of the
individual. And this nation, like other nations, would not agree to his
punishment by others for such "violations" reflecting the highest national policy.' 7

Accepting, for the moment, the view that states cannot be
expected to punish individuals guilty of unlawful acts "in collusion" with governmental authorities when the "highest national
policy" intervenes, might there not be an important middle
ground between cases of individual violation for private purposes and cases of individual acts in furtherance of a coordinated
national policy involving disregard of the disarmament agreement? Depending upon the degree to which the need for a disarmament agreement has actually been accepted within a state, it
certainly is to be expected that a sizeable portion of the public
would endorse compliance, and, depending upon the nature of
the government system, that public backing might translate into
effective support for elements within the government seeking to
oppose efforts to undercut or to violate the agreement. There
might exist, therefore, a class of cases in which the availability of
national enforcement measures might turn the tide against violation and prevent the crystallization of a firm high national policy either calling for or condoning the violation of the agreement.
Henkin's view of the application of national enforcement measures within the United States can be accepted in full only if
the national government is considered as a monolithic creature,
fully in the control of a group of men having a fairly uniform
assessment of the world and of the best interests of the United
States. This view may be accurate as of today with regard to
some events and to some national courses of action, but it is
submitted that a nation may not speak with so uniform a voice
under less than clear-cut circumstances. In addition, acceptance
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid. The texts of the United States and of the Soviet proposals calling for the enactment of national criminal laws are reproduced at notes 4-5
supra.
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and implementation of general and complete disarmament has
the potential of so altering the basis for international relationships as further to destroy the supposed monolithic character of
the state. What might not be possible today in the way of national enforcement of individual responsibilities under a disarmament agreement may become a political necessity in the future
as experience with and confidence in the agreement increases."s
Regardless of the circumstances prompting violation, it remains true that a disarmament agreement can be violated by
states only if individuals act to produce results prohibited by the
agreement. Although today it may be accurate to say that beyond
the case of private violation for private purposes there is little
scope for national action against individuals whose acts contribute to the violation,o that scope, as has been observed, can
be expected to increase, and the expected rate of increase would
itself be an important factor in inducing states to include some
national punishment scheme in the agreement. Ultimately it is to
be expected that successful practice will generate effective public
support for the agreement on all sides, thereby decreasing the
likelihood that any government would be able to construct or
carry out a high national policy contrary to its obligations under
the agreement.
In addition, a national enforcement scheme might prove
highly useful in the early stages of disarmament by providing a
mechanism for removing points of intergovernmental conflict
that otherwise would be likely to jeopardize the success of the
disarmament agreement. If individuals guilty of conduct prohibited by the agreement were punished by their own government, or by the government within whose jurisdiction the prohibited conduct had occurred, and if that government takes such
other action as may be necessary to nullify the effects of the
individual violation, then the other parties to the agreement
might regard the violation as erased, and the matter might be
dismissed without resort to formal action at the international
level. Such a sequence of events could result either from unauthorized private conduct or from partially authorized semiofficial conduct. In each case the discovery of the violation might
be regarded by the other states party to the agreement as potentially serious and perhaps as signalling the beginning of a pattern
of extensive violation that might ultimately result in the destruc18. See, e.g., Moch, Increasing Security Through, Disarmament, in A
WARLESS WORLD 11 (Larson ed. 1963).
19. See the comments by Henkin quoted in text accompanying notes 15-16
supra.
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tion of the agreement. The growing crisis could be overcome only
by the most persuasive showing that the government concerned
had repudiated those responsible and had taken every measure
possible to prevent its recurrence. National enforcement potential might increase in such a case since the need to punish to save
the agreement might become apparent, and swift implementation
of existing measures calling for national punishment of guilty
individuals might become a real possibility. If suitable procedures
had not been provided in the treaty and in national law, however, time and the pressure of events might outrun ad hoc action.
Beyond the question of the extent to which national governments can be expected to act to suppress individual violators of
a disarmament agreement, there remains the questions of the
circumstances under which it would be appropriate to apply sanctions to suppress violators and of whether the sanction should be
criminal punishment or some other form of national government
action.
A recent report by Roger Fisher 20 deals with these questions in
the context of taking punitive action against individual government officials responsible for noncompliance with arms limitations. Fisher's conclusions are that sanctions against government
officials are not likely to be effective in producing compliance
with "primary" rules of conduct, but that some sanction system
might be effective to ensure compliance with decisions of tribunals
entrusted with authority to decide claims of alleged violation of
"primary" rules. A primary rule, as that term is used by Fisher,
means the substantive limitations contained in the treaty, such
as rules prohibiting the production, retention, or deployment of
specified types of weapons. Fisher's recommendation is that sanctions ought not to be threatened or imposed against government
officials for violations of this type of primary rule, but only for
a subsequent failure or refusal to carry out an institutional decision that the original conduct had in fact been contrary to the
requirements of the agreement. 2 1
20. The report was prepared for the United States Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency. Fisher, Enforcement of Arms Control & Disarmament
Measures by the Imposition of Sanctions on Individual Officers (Harvard
Law School, March 1964).
21. Fisher comments as follows:
In view of the inherent ambiguity which all rules have, the very concept of compliance is imprecise unless there is an institutional and
authoritative means of defining the rule from time to time and applying
it to particular facts. Necessarily, any such decision is to some extent
ex post facto as to a particular violation. An operating law enforcement scheme is apparently less concerned with the question of whether
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Fisher's analysis rests on the proposition that a sanction system cannot be expected to operate as an effective deterrent to
action by government officials mainly for the reasons that punishment will not in fact be routinely imposed and that considerations other than the fear of criminal punishment are likely to be
controlling unless the rule is clear and explicit. Fisher also argues
that imposing sanctions for first-order violations would be an unwise policy mainly for the reasons that to the extent that fear of
punishment might prove effective, it would tend to deter "permitted conduct in the penumbra of the rule," and would also tend
to deter officials from disclosing acts feared to be in possible conflict with the rules emanating from the disarmament agreement. 3
In measuring the efficacy and wisdom of applying national
sanctions for violations of primary rules, a distinction must be
drawn between the reasonableness and potential of such sanctions
in cases of gross violation and in cases of arguable violation. As
Fisher points out, for example, within national governments
"those responsible for enforcement are reluctant to impose punishment on an officer for 'doing his duty' no matter how mistaken
or not the original rule was violated than with the desirability that
in the future there be compliance with this particular decision. Ought
sanctions to be threatened or imposed against government officers as
a means of producing compliance with particular institutional decisions
interpreting and applying arms limitations?
The answer to this question seems to be "yes". But the effectiveness of a sanction system in support of a decision depends primarily
not upon the sanction itself but upon getting into a position where a
sanction could be imposed.
Id. at 10.
22. See id. at 13-26. Fisher notes that officials are usually given a wide
range of freedom to interpret laws when penal sanctions are imposed, and
that, in any event, officials have powerful legal defenses, such as lack of
mens rea, official advice, superior orders, etc. Id. at 14-21. See also note 27

infra.
23. Id. at 30-33. Fisher notes that secrecy will be a problem in enforcement of disarmament, and that disclosure should be encouraged rather than
deterred; but:
Although a government official might not be deterred from engaging in some activity which he thought the circumstances required, fear
of personal punishment might deter him from public disclosure of
what he was doing. Because of the vagueness or ambiguity in the rule
an official could believe that he was behaving properly, but since a
mistake in his judgment might result in criminal punishment, he could
be expected to keep the facts as much in the dark as possible.
Id. at 30. Fisher also argues that to the extent that punishment is effective
as a deterrent, "officials might be influenced by personal concern rather than
public policy," and might therefore not make the wisest choice among permitted courses of conduct. Id. at 31.
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he may have been."2 Fisher also notes, however, that
The popular reluctance to punish officers for doing their duty as they
saw it apparently covers all conduct short of that which offends natural
law notions of morality. For such conduct as brutal third degree tactics
by police, or participation in programs of human slaughter by concentration camp officials, there is far less reluctance to impose punishment,
whether or not the conduct was in the performance of official duty.2 5

Reluctance to punish does have limits, and the limits are related
to the type of factors discussed by Fisher, such as the need to
interpret unclear rules, ignorance or mistake of law, and acting
under official advice as to the meaning of the applicable ruleF0
To note these limits in detail does not, however, meet the case of
a clear violation as to which, as has been said, it may be useful
to take sanction action to reassure the other parties to the agreement, if for no other reason.
The disadvantages found by Fisher to imposing sanctions for
first-order violations are likewise more applicable to the close
case than to the case of gross misconduct. If, for the reasons
outlined by Fisher, sanctions are understood to be effective only
as to gross violations, Fisher's disadvantages appear to lose
reality. Fisher notes that sanctions would tend to deter disclosure
of questionable conduct, but, conversely, first-order sanctions
would also tend to deter permitted conduct in the penumbra of
the rule. Each effect is conceivable as to different officials in a
sanctions system designed to reach and to punish even questionable conduct when later determined to have been contrary to the
rules,27 but surely such pressures would be minimal if sanctions
existed or were known to be applied only in cases of gross violation. In the latter case the "penumbral" deterrent effect is not
likely to "spill over and affect conduct that was on the per24.
25.
26.
27.
so far
Fisher

Id. at 14.
Id. at 28.
See id. at 18-26.
One may agree with Fisher that the sanctions system need not go
as to punish officials acting within what they regarded as the law.
comments that:
Underlying the whole notion of a deterrent system is the idea that
an individual at some point has a choice, and that a threat of punishment causes him to make the "good" rather than the "bad" choice.
Punishment is imposed upon the man who culpably makes the wrong
choice in order to deter him and others from doing so in the future.
The requirement of mens rea-a guilty state of mind-reflects the
unwillingness of courts to inflict punishment upon the man who did not
know he was acting improperly.

Id. at 16.
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mitted side of the rule."-2 Although there may be no such thing
as a crystal clear rule, there certainly are fact situations as to
which it is entirely clear that the normally vague rule applies.
Cases of gross violation excepted, however, Fisher may be accurate in arguing that sanctions ought to be confined to efforts to
secure compliance with authoritative decisions that a certain
course of conduct violates the disarmament agreement. As discussed below,29 sanctions to secure such "second-order compliance" might also form part of the national enforcement system,
and the capacity of the national legal system to accommodate
second-order compliance sanctions must be evaluated in the assessment of national enforcement of individual responsibility
under a disarmament agreement.
III. THE SOURCE OF SUBSTANTIVE RULES
AND REMEDIES
As has been mentioned above, the disarmament proposals
advanced both by the Soviet Union and by the United States
envisage their application to individual conduct only through
national action. That principle as phrased in the proposals does
not foreclose the question of the source from which substantive
rules are to be derived in particular cases, however. The basic
obligation under the United States proposals, for example, would
be for the states parties to the agreement to "enact national legislation in support of the Treaty imposing legal obligations on
individuals and organizations under their jurisdiction and providing appropriate penalties for noncompliance."30 Presumably
national legislation "in support of the Treaty" might mean anything from a point-by-point enactment of appropriate treaty provisions as national criminal law, to the enactment of one or more
civil or criminal statues which, in the judgment of the enacting
state, both translated the essential treaty obligations into national law applicable to individuals and organizations, and imposed "appropriate penalties" for noncompliance. In addition, it
is not clear whether the national legislation called for by the
quoted United States proposal would include national legislation to implement as against individuals such decisions as may
be taken by the International Disarmament Organization or by
some other body established by the agreement.

28. See note ,3 supra.
29. Part I(C) infra.
30. United States Plan, stage II, pt. G, para. 5, CURRNT DiSAIRhmNiT
PnorosALs 51, quoted in note 4 supra.
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The United States proposals are of course only an "Outline
of Basic Provisions" that might provide the framework of a
general and complete disarmament agreement. In national enforcement, as in many other respects, the proposals need considerable fleshing out before their full reach will become apparent.
The Soviet proposals, although cast as a "Draft Treaty," are at
least as vague, requiring only that the states parties to the treaty
"ensure the implementation in their territories of all control
measures ...
The basic question at issue, however, on the assumption that
the enforcement of individual responsibilities under the agreement will be left to national action, is, to what extent will the
treaty rather than national law serve as the source and definition
of individual obligations in particular cases? Will states be required to enforce individual obligations as defined in the treaty,
or by international legislation adopted pursuant to the treaty,
or will states be required only to take whatever action they may
decide is both necessary and appropriate in order to apply the
obligations arising under the agreement to individuals within
their jurisdiction? If the latter, to what extent would other states
and the international community have an effective opportunity
to contest the judgment of the enacting state?
The latter course would raise fewer practical and constitutional problems for the United States. If the United States' obligation were limited to making a judgment as to what national
legislation is required by the treaty, and to implementing that
judgment by national legislation adopted in the normal course,
few, if any, substantial constitutional questions would be raised.
As to practical political problems, according full scope to the
political process within each state with minimal interference by
31. Soviet Plan, art. 2, para. 1, CURRENT DISARMAENT PROPOSALS 8,
provides as follows:
1. The States parties to the Treaty solemnly undertake to carry
out all disarmament measures, from beginning to end, under strict
international control and to ensure the implementation in their territories of all control measures set forth in parts II, III and IV of the
present Treaty.
The Soviet Plan also specifies that the states parties to the agreement shall
enact national legislation prohibiting their citizens from serving foreign military purposes, which may mean that such activities are to be punished under
national criminal law. See id. arts 9(3), 10(3), at 8, 9, quoted at note 5 supra.
The Soviet Plan makes plain, however, that attempts by individuals "to
reconstitute" nuclear weapons shall be made a criminal offense under the
national law of each party to the disarmament agreement. See id. art 22(8), at
16, quoted at note 5 supra.
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any international authority would of course be more acceptable
to any society than would the opposing alternative of delegating
extensive rulemaking and supervisory powers to an international
authority. The fewer the international controls, however, the less
likely it would be that each side would have confidence that the
other is in fact observing the agreement. The final judgment must,
therefore, weigh both elements in the changed circumstances that
might be expected should disarmament become a present possibility. This report is limited, however, to a discussion of the constitutional problems that would be presented by the alternatives
as to the treaty framework within which national action might
apply the treaty obligations to individual action.
A.

THE

CONSTITUTIONALITY

OF A DISARMA1IENT

AGREE1VENT

Before considering the constitutional problems that might be
raised by the alternative methods of providing substantive rules
for national application to individual conduct, it is useful to dispose of some general aspects of the constitutionality of a disarmament agreement and of its application to individual conduct.
The basic question is the power of the federal government to
control arms transactions that involve persons subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States, and to agree with other countries to limit or to abolish armaments under international controls. Does the treaty power of the United States as established
under the Constitution extend to international agreements to
prohibit the manufacture, sale, transfer, possession, and use of
the types of armaments that might be reached by a disarmament
agreement? If such an agreement is permitted by the Constitution, may it be assumed that Congress has power under the
Constitution to adopt the necessary legislation to implement the
agreement?
The United States Supreme Court has never held an international agreement unconstitutional, and there is little reason to
suppose that a general and complete disarmament agreement
would be held to go beyond the treaty power. In a much quoted
statement as to the scope of the treaty power under the Constitution, Mr. Justice Field wrote in Geofroy v. Riggs, decided by
the Supreme Court in 1890:
That the treaty power of the United States extends to all proper
subjects of negotiation between our government and the governments
of other nations, is clear.

. .

. The treaty power, as expressed in the

Constitution, is in terms unlimited except by those restraints which
are found in that instrument against the action of the government or
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of its departments, and those arising from the nature of the government itself and of that of the States. It would not be contended that it
extends so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids, or a
change in the character of the government or in that of one of the
States, or a cession of any portion of the territory of the latter, without its consent. . . . But with these exceptions, it is not perceived that
there is any limit -to the questions which can be adjusted touching any
matter which is properly the subject of negotiation with a foreign
country. 32

That the limitation or the elimination of armaments is "matter which is properly the subject of negotiation with a foreign
country" is quite clear. As Louis Henkin has pointed out, the
"size of our armies, the character and extent of our armaments,
[and] whether we are or are not manufacturing weapons, are
questions of deep interest to other nations on which they may
wish to bargain.""
United States practice over the past 150 years demonstrates
conclusively that the United States regards arms control as a
matter of international concern. There are numerous occasions
on which the United States participated in arms control negotiations, some of which led in fact to the conclusion of arms control agreements accepted by the United States. Examples include the 1817 Great Lakes naval disarmament agreement, 4
3 and the
naval limitations following the First World War,"
1968 multilateral Test Ban Agreement." Every President of the
United States since World War II has sought some measure
of arms control through international agreement. And, as early
as 1948, the United States Senate endorsed these efforts by urging the President to exert a maximum effort "to obtain agreement
... upon universal regulation and reduction of armaments under

adequate and dependable guaranty against violation." 7
More recently, the United States explicitly adopted the goal of
general and complete disarmament, and has concluded a "Joint
Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations"
32. 133 U.S. 258, 266-67.
33. HENKIN, op. cit. supra note 6, at 28.
34. The Rush-Bagot Agreement With Great Britain, April 18, 1817, 8
Stat. 231, T.S. No. 1101/2.
35. The Washington Naval Treaty, Feb. 6, 1922, 43 Stat. 1655, T.S. No.
671.
36. The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in
Outer Space and Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, [1963] 2 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 1313,
TJ.A.S. No. 5433, in CuRRENT DISARM EmNT PROPOSALS 193-95.
37. The Vandenberg Resolution, S. Res. 239, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., para.
(5), (1948), 94 CONG. REc. 6053, quoted from BECHHOEFER, POSTWARt NEGOTIATIONs Fon Anms CONTRoL 100 (1961).
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with the Soviet Union which provides that the goal of the current disarmament negotiations is general and complete disarmament "accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures
for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace ... ."3 United States participation in this statement and in the Geneva meetings of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament leave no doubt that
present and past administrations have regarded a general and
complete disarmament treaty as within the treaty power under
the Constitution.
Considering the history of post-war disarmament negotiations,
in which disarmament clearly is treated as a matter of international concern by most states of the world, and considering the
practical requirements of the thermonuclear age, it would be a
novel and unwarranted construction of the treaty power to hold
that, absent some conflict with a particular provision of the Constitution, the treaty power would not extend to a general and
complete disarmament agreement. No court could be expected to
reach such a result.
Although it is therefore clear that generally speaking a general
and complete disarmament agreement is a "proper subject" for
the exercise of the treaty power, it is also clear, as seen in the
quoted passage from Mr. Justice Field's opinion in Geofroy v.
Riggsso that in some respects the treaty power may be limited
by "restraints" found in the Constitution. Mr. Justice Black
recently emphasized this proposition in Reid v. Covert,40 decided
by the Supreme Court in 1957, where he wrote that "no agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or
on any other branch of Government, which is free from the restraints of the Constitution."41 After quoting article VI, the supremacy clause of the Constitution, which provides in part that
"all Treaties made .. . under the Authority of the United States,

shall be the Supreme Law of the Land,"42 Mr. Justice Black
continued as follows:
There is nothing in this language which intimates that treaties and
laws enacted pursuant to them do not have to comply with the provisions of the Constitution.... It would be manifestly contrary to the
objectives of those who created the Constitution, as well as those who
38. Sept. 20, 1961, para. 1, U.N. Doc. No. A/4879 at 190 (1961), in
CURRENTDIsARArxNT PROPOSALS 189-91.
39. 133 U.S. 258 (1890); see text accompanying note 32 supra.

40. 354 U.S. 1.
41. Id. at 16.
42. U. S. CONST. art. VI.
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were responsible for the Bill of Rights-let alone alien to our entire
constitutional history and tradition-to construe Article VI as permitting the United States to exercise power under an international
agreement without observing constitutional prohibitions. .
. The
prohibitions of the Constitution were designed to apply to all branches
of the National Government and they cannot be nullified by the
Executive or by the Executive and the Senate combined. 43

Would any of the specific "prohibitions" or "restraints" in the
Constitution be thought to stand in the way of some necessary aspect of a general and complete disarmament agreement? Louis
Henkin considered this question in the context of his projection
of the provisions that would be likely to be included in a disarmament agreement.4 4 Henkin's assumption was that the agreement would oblige the United States and other parties to control, reduce, or eliminate research, testing, manufacture, and possession of described types of arms, munitions, and related materials. In addition, the agreement would establish some form of
inspection to give assurance that the parties actually honored
their disarmament and control obligations. Henkin postulated
that the inspectors might be foreign nationals responsible to an
international organization or to a foreign government, and that
the inspectors would need freedom of access to all relevant military and industrial installations, and might also need the right
to require reports from government officials, corporations, and
individuals, and the right to examine books, records, and other
relevant documents.
Against this background, Henkin discussed the possible impact of the following constitutional provisions: the clause of
article I, section 8, relating to the organizing, arming, and disciplining of the Militia; the second amendment, relating to the
"right of the people to keep and bear Arms"; the fifth amendment provision that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation"; and the
tenth amendment, which reserves to the states, or to the people,
the "powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitu-

tion, nor prohibited by it to the States. . . ."4 Henkin's general
conclusion is that the constitutional issues that might be presented
under these provisions by an arms control agreement are "small" 0
and that none presents "a serious obstacle to foreseeable plans for
43.
44.
45.
46.

354 U.S. at 16-17. (Footnotes omitted.)
Hnim, op. cit. supra note 6, at 18-24.
Id. at 33-45.
Id. at 45.
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the control of arms."47
Need this conclusion be changed in the light of the official
proposals that have been advanced subsequent to Henkin's study?
Or, are there any elements in some more comprehensive disarmament plan that might become realistic possibilities, and yet might
present more substantial constitutional questions? 3
The latter is an open-ended question that is not susceptible of
categorical response, due both to the uncertainty factors mentioned at the outset, and to our chronic inability to see even five
years into the future, and so to judge what might become a practical possibility with the passage of time. As to present proposals
and reasonable extrapolations from present proposals, however,
there appears to be no need to qualify Henkin's judgment. Insofar
as is relevant, the current official proposals do not differ materially
from the assumptions made by Henkin."
The provisions of the fifth and tenth amendments are likely
to present no problems in any event. Since a disarmament agreement would most probably be found to relate to a matter of international concern, and therefore to be within the treaty power,
both the agreement and any implementing legislation adopted by
Congress would be adopted in exercise of powers "delegated to
the United States by the Constitution," and hence would fall outside of the tenth amendment. As to the fifth amendment, Henkin
has documented the present unwillingness of the Supreme Court
to find that federal laws regulating economic activity are unconstitutional as a deprivation of property without due process of
47. Id. at 46.

48. See, e.g., Nathanson, The Constitution and World Government, 57
Nw. U.L. REV. 355 (1962), discussing constitutional problems presented by
the Clark and Sohn proposals. See note 2 supra.
49. Henkin's study is not directed to the alternative means of enforcing
individual responsibility under the disarmament agreement in American law,
however, which may raise some particular problems discussed in this report.
Henkin explains that:
The principal consequences of violation, on the other hand, are not
mentioned above; they are hardly considered in this study. Primarily
these are international and governmental in character and present few
problems in domestic law. The emphasis on a control system as a source
of early warning of a major violation, rather than a system designed
to prevent or punish such violations, suggests that the chief consequence of a serious breach of the agreement will be that the other
parties may feel freed from the limitations of the control treaty, take
steps provided in the treaty for this contingency, bring the matter before appropriate United Nations organs, or adopt various measures of
self-help.
HEN,

op. cit. supra note 6, at 19.
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law.5 0 Federal law now forbids, limits, or regulates dealings in
narcotics,r" fissionable materails,52 firearms, 3 liquor," inferior or
deceptive food products," and a host of other subjects of commerce despite incidental private loss or deprivation of private
property, as to which there is no compensation unless the property is found to have been "taken for public use."" There is no reason to suppose that these precedents would not also extend to a
general and complete disarmament agreement and to implementing legislation that prohibited the development, testing, manufacture, possession, etc., of defined classes of weapons, munitions,
and related material, even though such a requirement might
result in loss to private persons.
The difficulties presented by the constitutional provisions
relating to the militia and to the right to bear arms may be more
substantial, however. Under article I, section 10, the states are
forbidden to "keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace,"
without the consent of Congress, but under article I, section 8,
Congress is given power:
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and
for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of
the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress ....

Opinions differ as to the effect of the latter clause." May Congress abolish the militia, or does the Constitution reserve to the
states a right to maintain a militia? In the latter event, the Constitution would have to be amended to accommodate a disarma-

ment agreement that sought to limit or to abolish state militia
forces or, as is more likely, to require that such forces be counted
50. See id. at 89-45, 180-85 nn.47-74.
51. See, e.g., Opium Poppy Control Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 1045, 21 U.S.C.
§§ 188-88n (1958), as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 188k (Supp. V, 1964).
52. See, e.g., Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 919, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011296 (1958), as amended, 42 U.S.C. H§ 2021-241 (Supp. V, 1964).
53. See, e.g., Federal Firearms Act. 52 Stat. 1250 (1938), as amended,
15 U.S.C. §§ 901-09 (1958), as amended, 15 U.S.C. H§ 901-02 (Supp. V. 1964).
54. See, e.g., The Federal Alcohol Administration Act of 1935, 49 Stat.
977, as amended, 27 U.S.C. §§ 201-11 (1958).
55. See, e.g., The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 52 Stat.
1040, as amended, 21 U.S.C. H§ 301-92 (1958), as amended, 21 U.S.C. §§ 32181 (Supp. V, 1964).
56. The fifth amendment provides that private property shall not "be
taken for public use, without just compensation."
57. See HENKir, AnaRs CONTROL AND TNsPECTIoN IN AMERIcAN LAw 34-39,
177-80 nn.30-46 (1958).
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part of, and kept within the permitted strength of internal police
forces. 8
As regards the impact of a disarmament agreement on individuals, however, the second amendment right "to keep and bear
Arms" may be of greater significance. The second amendment provides as follows: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear
Arms, shall not be infringed."
The second amendment has been construed by the Supreme
Court, in a case involving federal firearms regulation, as limited
to the types of arms that might be required by the state militia."
The amendment would therefore give individuals no constitutional right to keep other kinds or quantities or arms, and, if Congress has the power to abolish the state militia, Congress might
also be able to abolish even this limited individual right to keep
and bear arms. If, however, article I, section 8, is construed to give
the states a right to keep a militia, the state might also have the
right to decide what arms are necessary for the militia, and what
arms might therefore be kept by individuals, despite the delegation to the Congress of power to arm the militia.o In these circumstances, the Constitution would have to be amended to preserve to the national government the power to prohibit the states
from acquiring types or quantities of arms prohibited by the
disarmament agreement.
The problem of state versus federal control over the size and
armaments of state militia is important even if militia are to be
regarded as permitted under the disarmament agreement. The
outline of the United States plan, for example, provides that one
objective is to ensure that after disarmament each party retains
"only those non-nuclear armaments, forces, facilities and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order
58. Article 36 of the Soviet Plan provides that after armed forces are
abolished, states shall have "strictly limited contingents of police (militia),
equipped with light firearms, to maintain internal order . . . ." CURRENT
DISARMAMENT PRoPosALs 23. The United States Plan provides that one of its
objectives is to ensure that after disarmament, "states would have at their
disposal only those non-nuclear armaments, forces, facilities and establishments
as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens." Id..at 30.
59. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939), discussed by HENKIN,
op. cit. supra note 57, at 37-39.
60. If article I, section 8, preserves to the states the right to keep a militia,
and therefore results in preserving to individuals a right to bear arms, that
latter right would still be controlled by the state by its decision as to what
arms are necessary for the militia.
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and protect the personal security of citizens." 6' The agreement as
to what is to be regarded as necessary for these purposes is to be
reached at the international level in negotiations over which the
constituent states of the United States ought to have no control. 2
Apart from the basic questions as to the constitutionality of
a disarmament agreement discussed above, additional questions
might be presented by particular inspection and verification provisions. These questions may bear heavily on the legal framework within which the obligations of the disarmament agreement
are to be enforced against individuals, and as appropriate they
are discussed in the sections that follow.
B.

CONGRESS AS THE

SOURCE

OF SUSTANTIVE RULES

The broad outlines of the constitutionality of a general and
complete disarmament agreement having been set forth in the
preceding section, we may now consider the additional constitutional problems that might be raised by the several alternative
means of applying the requirements of the disarmament agreement to individuals subject to United States law.
To begin with the least complicated case, would any substantial constitutional problems be presented if the substantive
rules to be applied by the federal government to individual action were to be provided by an Act of Congress? Under such a
scheme, the basic disarmament and control obligations would be
determined at the international level both in the treaty and in
subsequent action to be taken pursuant to the treaty by such
inspection and control organizations as might be established. 3
Each party to the treaty would, of course, assume an obligation
to carry out these international law obligations within its own
territory; but the international authority, or other states parties
to the treaty, would have no right to take independent or direct
action in the territory of another party except as explicitly provided in that state's national law. Complaints or allegations of
noncompliance would have to be dealt with at the international
level by such peaceful settlement and enforcement procedures
61. CURRENT DISA LAMENT PROPOSALS 30.
62. The Soviet Plan would include specific strength figures for the remaining "contingents of police (militia)" for each state. See art. 36, id. at 23.
The United States Plan would limit strength to what was "agreed to be
necessary."
63. See Soviet Plan, arts. 40-42, id. at 25-27, and United States Plan,
stage I, pt. G, id. at 39-43.
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as might be accepted in the treaty."
Assuming that the disarmament treaty is within the "treaty
power" under the Constitution, and that it does not violate any
express constitutional "restraints" or "prohibitions," a pure national enforcement system as described above raises no particular
constitutional problems. As has been noted, if the treaty is constitutional, then the Congress has power to enact "necessary and
proper" legislation to translate the treaty requirements into domestic law, and this legislative power would apply even in areas
in which, in the absence of the treaty, Congress might have had
no power to legislate.6 5 Thus, although the treaty may not
"authorize what the Constitution forbids,"" the adoption of the
treaty may enlarge the scope of the legislative power of the
Congress so as to encompass whatever legislation might be
necessary to carry out United States national enforcement obligations under the treaty.
Pure national enforcement is the normal method by which the
United States has sought to carry out its international obligations, and it is unexceptionable under the Constitution within the
limits on the treaty power that have been described. Is it likely,
however, that such a system would be regarded as adequate in
the case of a general and complete disarmament agreement?
In particular, although it no doubt would be provided in the
agreement that the basic framework of national enforcement
legislation must be in existence prior to completion of the disarmament process, what guarantee might be sought by the
international community that this legislation would be in fact
carried out, and that it would not be amended or abolished at
some later date?67 A similar problem is presented by national
enforcement of the decisions of the international organization
established to administer disarmament. Would it suffice to rely
64. The United States Plan provides in stage I, part H, for studies of
"rules of international conduct related to disarmament" and of measures to
make existing peaceful settlement procedures more effective, and to institute
new procedures where needed. Id. at 43-44. The results of these studies would
be acted on in stage II, and states would accept "without reservation" the
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice to decide "international legal disputes." Id. at 50-51.
65. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920); HMNKW, op. cit. supra
note 57, at 3-34.
66. Geofrey v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890); see text accompanying note
32 supra.
67. On the power of the Congress to nullify the domestic effect of treaties,
see part IV infra.
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upon national governments to adopt the necessary legislation to
carry out in their territories whatever additional rules might be
found to be necessary by the international disarmament organization?" In addition to these questions relating to the interests
of all states in receiving adequate assurance that the agreement
was in fact being carried out within each state, some states might
wish to provide in the agreement some procedures whereby compliance complaints might be resolved within each state in the
first instance, to avoid a situation in which states are forced to
rely on the international enforcement procedures in all cases.co
Although an assessment of the practical value of the alternative methods of national enforcement is beyond the scope of this
report, enough has been said to indicate that states are likely to
desire some more active role in supervising or policing the application of the norms of a disarmament agreement to individuals by
national action within each state. The following sections deal
with the main elements that might be added to a national enforcement scheme, and with the constitutional problems that
each might raise.

C.

ACCESS TO UNITED STATES COURTS By ACT OF CONGRESS

As a first step in introducing an international element into the
application of disarmament obligations to individuals in the
United States, it might be suggested that under some circumstances international officials, or officials of other governments,
should be given access to United States courts to aid in the enforcement of the United States law implementing the disarmament agreement. For example, federal law implementing the disarmament agreement might require some classes of business
enterprises to make reports to international inspection officials, or
to cooperate with an international inspection by giving the inspectors full and free access to the premises and to the firm's
business records. 0 Normally such a requirement would be enforced by injunction or penalty sought by some instrumentality
of the federal government. Situations might arise, however, in
which the federal official concerned declined to use his statutory
power to enforce this rule in a particular case, and it might be
considered useful to avoid this potential obstruction by permitting the international official to apply directly to the federal
courts for an injunction. A court order issued at the request of the
68. See part III(F) infra.
69. See the discussion in part I supra.
70. See the discussion in

HENKIN,

op. cit. supra note 57, at 61-83.
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international official might then be enforced by criminal punishment in the normal manner. Would this procedure raise any
substantial constitutional problems?
If the inspection, and requests for court orders to enforce the
rights of the inspectors, were to be carried out by federal officials,
no special constitutional problem would be presented. For the
reasons stated earlier, agreements to limit arms are within the
treaty power, and control and inspection of the arms industry, or
of potentially related activities, would fall within the power of
Congress to implement the treaty. Henkin concludes, for example, that:
As far as the Constitution is concerned, the United States could agree
and Congress could require, that reports be made and books be kept
by those engaged in arms and related industries; that these reports
be made available for international inspection at all times; that international inspectors be permitted to come at any time, without warrant,
to any industrial establishment within the framework of the arms
control regulation scheme, including mines, factories, and depots, to
inspect such reports and records, as well as to check operations and
inventory. The inspectors might make spot-checks, or inspectors might
be stationed permanently in a factory or other installation. Congress
could make it a crime punishable in the courts of the United States
to falsify records or reports required to be kept or to interfere with
inspection. And the inspectors could be authorized to use force to carry
out inspection were it resisted.71

The above assessment should be the same even if the inspectors were to be empowered to bypass United States officials in
carrying out their duties to the extent, at least, of making application to a United States court for orders running to private
individuals. 72 As to delegating power to international officials
to compel testimony, for example, Henkin writes:
There would seem to be no strong basis for doubt, for example, that
international officials may be authorized to require testimony. Since by
law or by treaty the testimony of Americans, official or private, can be
compelled, in appropriate situations, there would seem no fundamental
"due process" objection to requiring that such testimony be given in
the presence of international officials or even in their exclusive presence
where this would be necessary to implement the effective operation of
an arms control treaty. And there would seem to be no objection to
allowing the international inspecting body to issue subpoenas enforceable by criminal penalties in United States courts. True, it would be
the international inspectors who decided, in the first instance at least,
who should be interrogated and on what subjects relevant to the arms
control plan; and if a witness refused to answer or answered falsely,
he would be subject to contempt proceedings or criminal conviction in
71. Id. at 68.
72. See part I(E)

infra.
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the federal courts. Nevertheless, whatever "delegation" to the international officials this involves would appear to be minor, and does not
do violence to accepted principles and standards.73
As Henkin has pointed out, United States practice includes
several instances in which functions similar to the ones discussed
here have been delegated to international officials or to officials
of foreign governments.74 One example is the United States-Canadian International Joint Commission, which is authorized by
treaty and by act of Congress to administer oaths and to take
evidence in proceedings held in the United States. Where necessary, the commission may also apply to a United States court for
orders to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production
of evidence. Failure to comply with the court's orders is punishable as contempt of court."
Similar powers have been delegated by act of Congress to any
international tribunal or claims commission considering claims
1 The
in which the United States or its nationals have an interest.7
act gives these international bodies power to administer oaths
and hear testimony, and to require the attendance of witnesses
and the production of evidence without the need to apply for an
order of a United States court. Failure to comply with a subpoena
issued by such a tribunal is made contempt of the tribunal, punishable in federal courts in the same manner as contempt of court.
Nothing new would be added, so far as concerns the Constitution, by giving similar powers to an international inspection organization for the purpose of implementing the disarmament
agreement within the United States.77
The basic constitutional problems in the area of reporting,
interrogation, and inspection of facilities and records appear to
be the same whether the inspection tasks are carried out by national or by international officials. In each instance the substantive law governing the obligations of the individual would derive
from an act of Congress adopted in implementation of the treaty,
73. HIENKIN, op. cit. 3upra note 57, at 56.
74. Id. at 56-58, 190-91 nn.24-28.
75. The United States-Canadian International Joint Commission was
established by the Boundary Waters Treaty with Great Britain, Jan. 11, 1909,
art. VII, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S. No. 548, as implemented by the Act of March
4, 1911, 36 Stat. 1364, as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 268 (1958).
76. Act of July 3, 1930, § 1, 46 Stat. 1005, as amended, 22 U.S.C. H§ 27070g (1958).
77. See also part III(E) infra on access to United States courts by treaty.
In 1945 Congress adopted the International Organizations Immunities Act,
59 Stat. 669, 22 TJ.S.C. §§ 288-88f (1958), which empowers the President to
designate international organizations in which the United States participates
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and the statute would therefore be subject to the limitations on
federal action contained in the Constitution, but those limits
should be the same regardless of whether the individual is directed
by a United States court to comply with the lawful request of a
national or of an international official. There is no reason to give
the individual concerned any greater protection against an international official acting through United States courts under United
States law, than would now be given to that same individual
against a federal official acting through the same courts under the
same law.
The precedents considered up to this point have been concerned with applications for injunctions or for other forms of
equitable relief made by an international official to a United
States court acting under United States law. Would the constitutional problems be any different if the international official were
also given the power to initiate criminal prosecutions under
United States law of individuals subject to United States jurisdiction?
If the appropriate international officials are to be given power
to issue subpoenas, etc., and to apply for injunctions and enforcement orders in United States courts, there would probably rarely
be a need to seek criminal punishment for past acts as well. For
as being entitled to the privileges, exemptions, and immunities provided in
the act. These privileges, etc., include capacity to contract, to acquire and
dispose of real and personal property, and to institute legal proceedings. 59
Stat. 669 (1945), 22 U.S.C. § 288a (1958). In International Refugee Organization v. Republic S.S. Corp., 189 F.2d 858, 860 (4th Cir. 1951), Chief Judge
Parker held that this provision means "by necessary implication, that Congress has opened the doors of the federal courts to suits by such [designated]
international organizations; for the right to institute legal proceedings means
the right to go into court, and the federal courts are the only courts whose
doors Congress can open." Compare Testa v. Katt, 380 U.S. 386 (1947), in
which the Supreme Court held that the Rhode Island courts, having adequate
and appropriate jurisdiction under established local law, could not refuse to
enforce a federal claim on state public policy grounds. See also Balfour,
Guthrie & Co. v. United States, 90 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Cal. 1950), in which
the district court held that the United Nations had capacity to sue the
United States under the Suits in Admiralty Act in cases in which the United
States had consented to be sued by other litigants. This result was derived
from the designation of the United Nations as an organization entitled to the
benefits of the International Organizations Immunities Act by Exec. Order
No. 9698, 11 Fed. Reg. 1809 (1946), but the court also commented that
the same result would follow directly from the Charter of the United Nations,
art. 104, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1053, T.S. No. 993, which provides that the
United Nations "shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such
legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the
fulfillment of its purposes."
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the reasons stated in part I of this report, however, some states
might insist that a capacity to take punitive action of this character be built into the disarmament agreement, and it is therefore
useful to ask whether under the Constitution the power to prosecute might be delegated to international officials."
United States practice has been to give the Attorney General
exclusive control over the initiation of criminal proceedings in
United States courts for violations of United States law.79 As
unbroken as this practice may have been, however, it is submitted
that it need not be viewed as constitutionally required.
Almost certainly the delegation to international officials of
power to prosecute would substantially alter the realities of
political power in federal criminal prosecutions in cases that arouse
great public interest. If power to prosecute is delegated to international officials, public opinion either for or against prosecution
in particular circumstances would have to be directed both
towards federal officials, as it is today, and towards international
officials, and this fact would certainly tend to dilute the impact
of public opinion at least where the object sought was to prevent
prosecution. It is not considered, however, that the accused would
have any constitutional right to protect whatever political power
he might have had to prevent prosecution through mobilization
of public opinion.o
The constitutional rights of the accused would be the same
whether the prosecution was initiated by a national or by an
international official. Our assumption is that the trial would be
in a United States court under United States law and therefore
subject to the limits and guarantees of the United States Constitution, even if the prosecutor were an international official. The
constitutional defects seen by some writers as to the establishment of international courts for the trial of offenses committed
within the jurisdiction of the United States, or as to the delegation of legislative power to an international organization,s1 are
78. See also part II supra, on the reality of individual responsibility.
79. See HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL CouRTs AND THE FEDERAL SysTEM 1137-88 (1953), where it is noted that "Congress has thus far maintained
unimpaired the Attorney General's control of the initiation of criminal proceedings."
80. For a discussion of the prosecuting attorney's discretion not to prosecute, see HART & SACKS, THE LEGAL PRocEss: BASIc PROBLEMS IN THE
ING AND APPLIcATIoN OF LAW 1078-91 (Tentative ed. 1958); Schwartz, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and Prosecutor's Discretion, 18 LAw & CONTEi.
PRoB. 64 (1948).
81. See, e.g., HENKIN, op. cit. supra note 57, at 122-52; Nathanson, supra
note 48, at 869-78.

1965]

INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT

919

not presented if the international element is limited to prosecution by the international official. The accused would, therefore,
have as full a measure of constitutional protection as he would
have had were the prosecutor to have been a United States official.
The constitutional problems presented by the delegation to international officials of power to prosecute should therefore be no
more substantial than those presented by the delegation to international officials of power to subpoena witnesses and evidence, to
take testimony, and to apply for injunctions and for court orders
to punish for contempt or for failure to comply with a court
order.82
The power to apply for injunctions, or to initiate criminal
prosecutions, and the other powers that might be delegated to international officials as part of a national enforcement scheme in
the United States, would, it is assumed, rest on United States
statutes enacted in fulfillment of the obligations of the disarmament agreement. Being founded on an act of Congress, each
instance of delegation of powers to international officials presents
the question of the extent to which it might remain within the
power of the Congress to take away by statute that which it has
given by statute, thereby placing the United States in breach of
the disarmament agreement. This question is discussed in a
separate section below. 3
D.

THE TREATY AS THE SouncE op SuBsTANTIvE RULES

In the preceding sections it was assumed that the substantive
rules to be applied to individual action in the national enforcement scheme would be fashioned by national legislatures in fulfillment of the obligation assumed by each party to the agreement to ensure the implementation of the agreement within their
territories. It might be desirable, however, to provide that at
least as regards some particular rules contained in the agreement,
the rules would apply directly to the acts of individuals and of
organizations within each state without their prior adoption by
the national legislature. It might also be desirable to give the
international disarmament organization some authority to adopt
additional particular rules which would also apply directly to individual action within each state without explicit adoption by the
national legislature. Would such a procedure be consistent with
the United States Constitution?
82. See the passage from Henkin quoted in text accompanying note 73
supra.
83. See part IV infra.
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The assumption here is that the enforcement of the substantive
rules prohibiting or requiring certain conduct on the part of
individuals subject to the jurisdiction of the states parties to
the agreement would be carried out within the national framework, but that some of the substantive law applied would be international in origin. For example, the treaty might provide that
no individual or organization within a state may possess certain
specified weapons or related materials. The treaty might also
provide that the prohibition shall be directly applicable within
each state without further action by the government of that
state, and that officials of the international disarmament organization shall act to enforce the prohibition through civil and
criminal proceedings brought in the national courts of each state
party to the agreement." Would action by Congress be necessary
to carry out such a procedure under the Constitution, and what
would be the result if Congress failed to pass the appropriate
legislation, or withdrew its consent at a later date? In addition,
would it be possible under the Constitution to provide in the
treaty that an international disarmament organization might expand or interpret the rules set forth in the treaty, and that the
new rules made or developed by the international organization
shall also be directly applicable to individual action within the
United States?
The extent to which it may be necessary to obtain the concurrence of the Congress to apply internationally developed rules
to individual action within the United States is considered in this
section. The further problem of the effect of a later modification
or withdrawal of congressional concurrence is considered in part
IV below.
1.

Rules Containedin the TTeaty

It would be no novelty under United States law to conclude
a treaty that contained substantive rules intended to apply directly to individuals within the United States without having
first been adopted or enacted by the Congress. Contrary to the
practice of many states, in the United States a treaty may be
"self-executing" in the sense that, if intended to do so, rules
contained in the treaty may take effect as internal law enforceable in United States courts without implementation by act of
Congress.
84. Compare the Clark and Sohn proposals, providing for enforcement by
trial in United Nations regional courts. Arts. 63-66, CURRENT DISAwmAMENT
PnorosALs 126-30; see note 3 supra.
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The Supreme Court has said that although treaties are primarily compacts between nations depending for their enforcement on political acts and intentions of the contracting governments, treaties may also contain provisions that confer rights
"which partake of the nature of municipal law, and which are
capable of enforcement as between private parties in the courts
of the country."8 5 In the United States this result derives from
the provision of article VI of the Constitution that "all Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land. . . ." The Supreme
Court has read the quoted portion of article VI to mean that
a treaty "is a law of the land as an act of Congress is, whenever
its provisions prescribe a rule by which the rights of the private
citizen or subject may be determined.""" When rights contained
in treaty provisions "are of a nature to be enforced in a court of
justice, that court resorts to the treaty for a rule of decision ...
as it would to a statute."8 7 Treaty provisions having this character are termed "self-executing."
The test in deciding whether a treaty provision is self-executing or not is one of construction of the treaty based on the intent
of the parties.8 8 The question is, did the states party to the treaty
intend that the provisions of the treaty, or the particular provision in question, shall have immediate effect on private relationships coming within the scope of the treaty, or only that each state
shall enact such legislation as may be necessary to give effect to
the treaty norms within its boundaries? In a case presenting the
question of whether a particular treaty provision applied directly to private rights even though not implemented by an act
of Congress, Chief Justice Marshall of the Supreme Court phrased
the test as follows:
85. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884) (Miller, J. writing for a
unanimous Court).
86. Id. at 598-99.
87. Id. at 599.
88. The RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIoNs LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 157, at 569 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962), provides as follows: "Whether
an international agreement of the United States is or is not self-executing is
finally determined as a matter of interpretation by courts in the United States
if the issue arises in litigation." The rule is based on the Supreme Court's
holdings in Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829), and United States v.
Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833), in which the same treaty was at first
held not self-executing based on the English text which read that the land
grants in question "shall be ratified and confirmed" but was later held to be
self-executing when the Court was informed that the equally authentic Spanish text read "shall remain ratified and recognized." See Henry, When Is a
Treaty Self-Executing, 27 MIcH. L. REv. 776 (1929).
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A treaty is in its nature a contract between two nations, not a
legislative act. It does not generally effect, of itself, the object to be
accomplished, especially so far as its operation is infra-territorial; but
is carried into execution by the sovereign power of the respective
parties to the instrument.
In the United States a different principle is established. Our constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently,
to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the
legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any
legislative provision. But when the terms of the stipulation import a
contract, when either of the parties engages to perform a particular
act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute the contract before it can
become a rule for the Court.89

So phrased, the self-executing character of treaty provisions
would appear to be limited only by the intent of the makers of
the treaty. Exceptions are usually asserted to exist, however. It
is said that a treaty cannot be self-executing to the extent that
its terms would require the Government to take some action that
under the Constitution can be taken only by the Congress.co
The basis for such an exception is the theory that the Constitution reserves certain powers exclusively to the Congress as a
whole, and that, therefore, it would be unconstitutional to accomplish domestic results in these areas through use of the treaty
power which involves obtaining the consent of only one branch
of the Congress.
The only firm example of this asserted exception to the selfexecuting treaty doctrine is that treaty provisions calling for the
payment of public money may be carried out only pursuant to
legislation adopted by the Congress. Article I, section 9, of the
Constitution provides in part that "No Money shall be drawn
from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made
by Law . . . ." Only Congress is given the power to "pay the Debts
... of the United States. . . ."o' In an early federal case involving

the proceeds from the sale of public lands, the Court held that:
A treaty under the federal constitution is declared to be the
supreme law of the land. This, unquestionably, applies to all treaties,
where the treaty-making power, without the aid of congress, can
carry it into effect. It is not, however, and cannot be the supreme law
of the land, where the concurrence of congress is necessary to give it
89. Foster v. Neilson, supra note 88, at 814.
90. See e.g., RESTATEMENT, op. cit. supra note 88, § 144(3), at 515. Id. comment f, at 519, states that a treaty is not self-executing "if it deals with a subject matter that by the Constitution is reserved exclusively to Congress."
(Emphasis in original.)
91. U. S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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effect. Until this power is exercised as where the appropriation of
money is required, the treaty is not perfect. It is not operative, in
the sense of the constitution, as money cannot be appropriated by the
treaty-making power. This results from the limitations of our government. The action of no department of the government, can be
regarded as a law, until it shall have all the sanctions required by the
constitution to make it such. . . . It cannot bind or control the legislative action in this respect, and every foreign government may be
presumed to know, that so far as the treaty stipulates to pay money,
the legislative sanction is required. Without a law the president is not
authorized to sell the public lands, so that this treaty, though so far as
the Indians were concerned, was the supreme law of the land, yet, as
regards the right to the proceeds of the above tract, an act of congress
is required. 92

A similar result might be reached as to other types of treaty
provisions that were thought to call for action by the Government that under the Constitution can only be taken by the Congress. For example, a second type of treaty provision that might
be an exception to the self-executing treaty doctrine is a treaty
provision that would require a change in the revenue laws for
implementation. Article I, section 7, of the Constitution provides in part that "All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate
in the House of Representatives. . . ." In the view of one com-

mentator," this clause means that legislation by Congress would
be necessary to give effect to a treaty provision providing for
changes in existing revenue laws since to hold otherwise would be
to deprive the House of Representatives of the role given to it by
the Constitution in the enacting of revenue laws. The House insists on this interpretation. In 1880, for example, the House of
Representatives adopted a resolution in which it declared that the
conclusion by the Executive of commercial treaties purporting
to establish rates of duty on foreign imports without an act of
Congress would, "in view of the provision of section 7 of Article I
of the Constitution of the United States, be an infraction of the
Constitution and an invasion of one of the highest prerogatives
of the House of Representatives."9 4 No doubt because of the existence of the special responsibilities of the House under article
I, section 7, the practice of the Executive has been to seek an act
of Congress to implement treaties calling for changes in the
92. Turner v. American Baptist Missionary Union, 24 Fed. Cas. 344,
845-46 (No. 14251) (C.C.D. Mich. 1852).

93. Anderson, The Extent and Limitations of the Treaty-Making Power
Under the Constitution, 1 (pt. 2) Am. J. INT'L L. 636, 648-53 (1907).
94. H. Res. of Jan. 26, 1880, 46th Cong., 2d Sess., 10 CONG. REc. 532,
THEm \AKNG AND ENFORCEMNT 196
(2d ed. 1916).

quoted from CRADALL, TREATIES:
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revenue laws. The theoretical question of the possible self-executing character of such provisions has, therefore, not been decided."5
A leading work on the United States law of treaties concludes:
It appears that whatever may be the ipso facto effect of treaty
stipulations, entered into on the authority of the President and Senate,
on prior inconsistent revenue laws, not only has the House uniformly
insisted upon, but the Senate has acquiesced in, legislation by Congress
to give effect to such stipulations ...

96

A distinction is drawn, however, between treaties that require
a "change" in the revenue laws, such as a treaty fixing tariff rates
or providing for a reduction in tariff rates for particular classes of
goods, and treaties that provide for unconditional most-favorednation treatment. United States practice has been to give effect
to most-favored-nation clauses without seeking supplementary
legislation on the theory that such clauses do not "change" the
revenue laws by fixing rates of import duties or by limiting the
rate that may be established by the Congress, but only extend
to the parties to the treaty the most favorable rate fixed for any
class of goods imported from any country. 7 Since most-favorednation clauses are intended to prevent discrimination in rates of
import duties and therefore are intended to take future changes
into account, they must be self-executing as their purpose would
be defeated if they could not operate without supplementary
legislation." For this reason the courts have held that unconditional most-favored-nation clauses are intended to be, and are,
self-executing, even where the result is to avoid a tariff act provision that conditions the lowest rate on reciprocity from the
exporting country."9 In other words, an unconditional mostfavored-nation clause will give the contracting state the benefit
of the lowest rate fixed by the Congress even if the tariff act
provides that the lowest rate shall be available only where that
95. See the discussion in CRANDAL, op. cit. supra note 94, at 18-99.
96. Id. at 195.
97. See the opinion expressed by the Solicitor for the Department of State
in 1928 that "Most favored nation clauses,. . . do not fix or limit the rates
of duty which Congress may impose . . ." and therefore do not "in terms

operate to increase, reduce or fix rates of duty," and can be implemented
without legislation. Quoted from 5 HACKWORTH, INTERNATIONAL LAw 180
(1943).
98. The RESTATEMENT, op. cit. 8upra note 88, § 158, at 572, provides that
most-favored-nation clauses are interpreted as self-executing unless the agreement specifically indicates otherwise. This rule is based on the need for automatic application of tariff reductions. See id. at 573-74.
99. See John T. Bill Co. v. United States, 27 C.C.P.A. (Customs) 26,
104 F.2d 67 (1939).
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rate does not exceed the rate charged by the exporting country
on American imports in the same class. Giving self-executing
effect to a most-favored-nation clause under these circumstances
would appear to change the revenue laws, since it provides an
exception to a rate fixed by the Congress, but this constitutional
00
argument apparently has not been pressed upon the courts.
Each of the two possible exceptions to the self-executing
treaty doctrine discussed above, namely treaty provisions that
require either the payment of money from the United States
Treasury or a change in the revenue laws, is based on a specific
provision of the Constitution that would appear to be bypassed
if a treaty provision in these areas were to be regarded as selfexecuting. For that reason there is substance to the view that in
these areas a treaty provision cannot be self-executing even
though the Constitution states with generality that all treaties
made under the authority of the United States shall be the
"supreme Law of the Land." There may also be other areas in
which it might be argued that the exclusive delegation to the
Congress of some particular power precludes the conclusion of
a self-executing treaty. 01 These areas, including the two that
have already been mentioned, will no doubt be of some importance in the entire context of a disarmament agreement, but
they do not appear to be of great importance for present purposes. For example, while it will no doubt be necessary to provide a stable source of funds to finance an international disarmament organization, and to do so it may be necessary to provide some form of automatic payment out of national treasuries
or through the national revenue collections 02 these points are
not directly related to the concept of enforcing individual responsibility for acts or omissions contrary to norms established
by the disarmament agreement.
Whatever the precise limits of the "exclusive delegation" exception to the self-executing treaty doctrine, it seems clear that
the exception does not apply to the usual case of delegation to
the Congress of power to act in specified areas. The Congress
acts only on the basis of delegated powers, including the power
100. See Catudal, The Most-Favored-Nation Clause and the Courts, 35
A. J. INT'L L. 41, 53-54 (1941). The court in the Bill Co. case, supra note 99,
held that the clause in question was self-executing, but did not mention the
constitutional question, and that question was not raised by the parties.
101. One example is the acquisition of territory. See CRANDAL, op. cit.
supra note 94, at 200-29.
102. See, e.g., the Clark and Sohn proposed "Revenue System" for the
World Disarmament and World Development Organization, arts. 82-89,
CURRENT DISARAIAMENT PROPOSALs 157-61.
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to "make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper" to carry
out all powers vested by the Constitution in the Government
of the United States. 0 If treaties, which are declared by article
VI to be the "supreme Law of the Land," were to be selfexecuting only in areas outside of the specific powers delegated
to the Congress, little scope would be left in which treaties
would in fact be the "supreme Law of the Land."' Indeed, such
a broad rule would require considerable change in existing practice, some of which has been sanctioned by the courts. 05 To
take one example, article I, section 8, of the Constitution gives
the Congress power to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations," but, as has been noted, certain types of provisions in
commercial treaties have been held to be self-executing, and the
usual practice is to consider many other types of commercial
treaty provisions to be self-executing. 0 Mere delegation of
power to act does not mean exclusive delegation in the sense of
excluding lawmaking by treaty.
The exceptions noted deal with areas in which the language
of the Constitution leads to the result that only Congress shall
take certain action: "All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate
0 and "No Money shall be drawn from the
in the House,"o'
Treasury," except by appropriation by Congress. 0 It is sometimes asserted that other particular powers are also exclusive
in this sense, however. 09 For example, Chief Justice Fuller expressed the view in a 1901 case concerning the collection of import duties on goods brought into the United States from
Puerto Rico, that "it certainly cannot be admitted that the
power of Congress to lay and collect taxes and duties can be
curtailed by an arrangement made with a foreign nation by the
President and two thirds of a quorum of the Senate."" 0 The
103. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
104. Under article VI, a treaty supersedes a prior act of Congress and all
inconsistent state law, whether enacted before or after the treaty. See 2
SCHwARTz, A ConMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
124-25 (1963); part IV infra.
105. In Cook v. United States (The Mazel Tov), 288 U.S. 102 (1933), for
example, the Supreme Court held that a treaty with Great Britain had superseded a prior inconsistent act of Congress relating to the power of the Coast
Guard to board, search, and seize vessels beyond the territorial waters of the
United States. See also part III(D) 2 infra.
106. See RESTATEVENT, Op. cit. 3upra note 88, § 144, comment f, at
519-20.
107. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (Emphasis added.)
108. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (Emphasis added.)
109. See, e.g., CRANDAuL, op. cit. supra note 94, at 119-20.
110. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 370 (dissenting opinion).
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Chief Justice may have meant to "imply" that no treaty could alter
arrangements established by the Congress under its article I,
section 8, power to "lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and
Excises," but he gave no reasoning that would conform this result to the supremacy clause provisions of article VI.P
It has also been suggested without specific constitutional
foundation that treaties cannot be self-executing to the extent
of creating criminal law without an act of Congress." 2 In a case
arising under the 1924 liquor treaty with Great Britain,"s a
United States district court held that the seizure provisions of
the liquor treaty were not self-executing and went on to say:
Now the grant by one sovereign to another of the right to seize its
nationals upon the high seas without process and by force majeure for
crimes committed by those nationals against the offended sovereign,
by no means declares that those acts when committed on the high
seas constitute such crimes. If, before this treaty was contracted, the
unlading of merchandise by a ship of British registry at a point more
than four leagues removed from the coast of the United States did not
constitute a crime against the United States (and there appears to be
no contention that it did), then the treaty could not and did not
make it a crime.
...
As a treaty, there was no need of congressional legislation to
make it effective, and in this sense all treaties are self-executing. But
if it was the intent of the government to make it a crime for a ship
of British registry to unlade liquor within a sea zone on our coast,
traversible in one hour, then that intent was not effectuated by the
mere execution of the treaty. It is not the function of treaties to enact
the fiscal or criminal law of a nation. For this purpose no treaty is
self-executing. Congress may be under a duty to enact that which
has been agreed upon by treaty, but duty and its performance are
two separate and distinct things. Nor is there any doubt that the treaty
making power has its limitations. What these are has never been defined, perhaps never need be defined. Certain it is that no part of the
criminal law of this country has ever been enacted by treaty." 4

In arriving at the above quoted conclusion, the district court
cited no precedent or provision of the Constitution. The court
111. Chief Justice Fuller cited only 2 TuCKER, THE CONSTITUTION §§ 35456 (1899).
112. See WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF AMRmCAN FOREIGN RELATIONs 356
(1922).
113. The Liquor Treaty With Great Britain, Jan. 23, 1924, art. II, 43 Stat.
1761, T.S. No. 685, provided that Great Britain would not object to the
boarding of private British-flag vessels within one-hour's sailing distance of
the United States coast for the purpose of determining whether liquor on
board was intended to be imported illegally into the United States. See
Dickinson, Are the Liquor Treaties Self-Executing?, 20 Amv. J. INT'L L. 444
(1926).
114. The Over the Top, 5 F.2d 838, 844-45 (D. Conn. 1925).
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also failed to consider that the question presented was not
whether the liquor treaty purported to make acts defined in the
treaty punishable as crimes in United States courts, and for that
reason conflicted with the Constitution, but whether the effect
of the treaty was to extend United States territorial waters
from three marine miles to one-hour's travel so as to bring acts
committed within the new limit also within the existing framework of crimes defined and punished by act of Congress. Viewed
in the latter terms, the question of constitutional limits on selfexecution of the liquor treaty provisions becomes one of extending United States jurisdiction, and therefore of extending
the substantive framework of United States criminal law, to
additional geographic areas, rather than of creating new criminal
law by treaty. The Supreme Court later read the liquor treaty
as self-executing to the extent of modifying the existing statutory
provisions as to the area within which ships and individuals
could be seized for violation of the existing liquor laws, but in
so holding, the Court apparently did not consider that the treaty
had changed the area within which the existing criminal law of
the United States might be applied to define the substantive
offense for which the individuals so seized might be prosecuted.x"
At least one Supreme Court case holds that the area within
which substantive criminal law enacted by Congress applies
may be defined by treaty, however."6 An Indian treaty concluded in 1863 ceded land to the United States, but sought to
preserve the character of the ceded land as "Indian country"
for purposes of prohibiting and punishing the sale of alcoholic
beverages under existing federal law. The clause in question,
article 7 of the treaty, read as follows:
The laws of the United States now in force, or that may hereafter
be enacted, prohibiting the introduction and sale of spirituous liquors
in the Indian country, shall be in full force and effect throughout the
country hereby ceded, until otherwise directed by Congress or the
President of the United States." 7

The Court held that Congress, under its article I, section 8,
power to "regulate Commerce . .. with the Indian Tribes" would
115. See Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1983); Ford v. United
States, 273 U.S. 593 (1927); Nathanson, The Constitution and World Government, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 355, 362--64 n.16 (1962).

116. United States v. Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188
(1876).
117. Id. at 191, quoting from Treaty With the Red Lake and Pembina
Bands of Chippewa Indians, Oct. 2, 1863, art. VII, 13 Stat. 667.
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have had power to prohibit the sale of liquor not only in existing
Indian country, but also in areas that have ceased to be Indian
country because of cession to the United States. Turning to the
question of achieving the same result by treaty rather than by
act of Congress, the Court concluded:
It is true, Congress has not done this: but the Constitution declares
a treaty to be the supreme law of the land; and Chief Justice Marshall,
in Foster and Elam v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 314, has said, "That a treaty is
to be regarded, in courts of justice, as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself, without the aid of any legislative
provision." No legislation is required to put the seventh article in
force; and it must become a rule of action, if the contracting parties
had power to incorporate it in the treaty of 1863. About this there
would seem to be no doubt.118

The effect of the treaty provision was to redefine the term "Indian country" as used in existing federal statutes so as to retain
the benefits of these statutes in the areas ceded by the Indians
to the United States. The result, therefore, was to continue the
existing federal criminal law in the territory, rather than to extend that law to additional areas or to create new crimes by
treaty. One commentator has concluded that:
... the effect of the treaty provision was not actually to create a new
crime, but rather to prevent the treaty itself from operating so as to
remove the territory from the application of existing criminal law.
Regarded in this light the decision seems to be a long way from holding
that the United States, acting through treaty alone, may create new
criminal law applicable within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States."19

In no case is it clear that the United States has sought to make
domestic criminal law by self-executing treaty,o2 0 except to the
extent that an analogous result may have been achieved by the
118. 93 U.S. at 196.
119. Nathanson, supra note 115, at 363 n.16.
120. The following two holdings do not entirely accord with this view
however:
In Ex parte Toscano, 208 Fed. 938 (S.D. Cal. 1913), the court held that
the provision of the Hague Convention on Neutrality in Land Warfare, Oct.
18, 1907, art. 11, 86 Stat. 2324, T.S. No. 540, that neutral powers shall intern
troops belonging to belligerent armies if such troops cross into neutral territory, was self-executing, and gave the President power to detain troops involved in a civil war in Mexico that had crossed over into the United States.
See McCLuiE, WoRLD LEGAL ORDER 109-11 (1960), for a discussion of this
case.
In United States v. Kearny, 2 Extraterr. Cas. 665 (1923), the defendant was
charged with traffic in arms and munitions in violation of treaties with China,
and tried for these treaty crimes in an extraterritorial court. The court upheld
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liquor treaties and by the Indian treaty discussed above. The
fact that there has been no practice in this area does not
demonstrate that the treaty power may not be used to create
criminal law, however, and, as has been noted, no specific constitutional provision settles the point. 1
The discussion thus far has centered on the extent to which
treaty provisions may be considered as self-executing under
United States law. Although the precedents are few, and no
bright line emerges to define the area in which action by Congress is necessary to implement treaty provisions to translate
them into internal law of the United States, two tentative conclusions may be stated: First, the appropriations and revenue
laws precedents indicate that some constitutional provisions
give exclusive powers to the Congress as a whole that may not
be bypassed by the treaty device. Second, in the generality of
cases in which some legislative power has been delegated to the
Congress, that fact standing alone is not enough to withdraw
these subjects from the area in which self-executing treaty provisions may make domestic law. These two conclusions may
lead to the result that the supremacy clause (article VI) means
that treaty provisions may be self-executing unless some specific
constitutional provision makes clear that the action sought may
be taken only by the Congress as a whole, and therefore may
not be taken by the President and the Senate acting through
the treaty power.m
If, as suggested, the proper approach would be to permit selfexecuting treaty provisions so long as no specific constitutional
clause stands in the way, most of the norms to be applied to
individual action by a disarmament treaty might become part
of domestic law as self-executing treaty provisions. The treaty
the prosecution on the following grounds:
It is claimed that these treaty provisions are not self-executing; but we
are unable to see why not. They prohibit contraband trade in China on
the part of American citizens, define its scope and impose penalties for
carrying it on. These provisions appear to us practically equivalent
to the ordinary penal statute and we see no reason why they could
not be enforced by an ordinary criminal prosecution. True, the penalties are somewhat unusual - leaving the offender "to be dealt with
by the Chinese government" and, later, confiscation -but this Court
is given discretion to impose additional ones.
Id. at 669. (Footnote omitted.)
Neither of these cases involved the creation of criminal law by treaty applicable within the United States to United States citizens, however.
121. See text accompanying note 112 supra.
122. Compare note 90 supra.
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might, for example, supersede federal statutes regulating manufacture, transport, possession, and use of weapons, fissionable
material, and related items. It might also place a duty on individuals to cooperate with international inspectors within the
boundaries mentioned abovel 23 in such matters as making reports
on manufacturing activities, etc., and permitting inspection. Each
of these areas would be within the legislative power of Congress,
but no specific constitutional provision appears to withdraw these
areas from lawmaking by self-executing treaty.
The available precedents would uphold the making of substantive rules applicable to individual action by self-executing
treaty provision, but it is not entirely clear that these precedents
would also extend to implementing or enforcement measures
made domestic law by self-executing treaty. As noted above, the
theory discernible in the precedents should permit self-execution
of enforcement measures as well as of substantive rules, but
other particular problems have been thought to exist in the enforcement area along two lines that are discussed in separate
sections below: the necessity for a statute as the basis for a
criminal prosecution; and access to United States courts by
treaty.

2.

The Necessity for a Statute as the Basis for a Criminal
Prosecution

As has already been mentioned, some authorities have expressed the view that domestic criminal law may not be created
by self-executing treaty. 24 No constitutional provision explicitly
dictates this result, however, and, due to the fact that no clear
cases exist in which it has been sought to use the treaty power
to create criminal law applicable directly within the United
States, no clear precedents exist.
Three distinct lines of reasoning might be used to lead to the
result that criminal law may not be created by self-executing
treaty: First, that the making of domestic criminal law is not
within the treaty power since that power is limited to matters
of "international concern"; second, that there is some constitutional barrier to applying the self-executing treaty doctrine in
the area of substantive criminal law established by treaty; and,
third, a variant of the second argument, that by the process of
interpretation and settled practice, it has become established
123. See the discussion in part III(A) supra.
124. See text accompanying note 114 supra; WRIGHT,
112. Compare Dickinson, supra note 118, at 449-50.

Op.
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that all federal criminal law in the United States must be
founded on some statute, and that neither treaty crimes nor
common law crimes may be punished in the United States unless
incorporated in an act of Congress.
The first argument, relating to the subject matter that legitimately falls within the scope of the treaty power, has been

answered above.12 5
The second argument, relating to the application of the selfexecuting treaty doctrine to criminal provisions, ought to depend upon whether some exclusive power has been delegated to
the Congress under the Constitution to define and punish crimes
against the United States. 26 No explicit constitutional provision
gives Congress exclusive power over the definition and punishment of crimes, however. In fact, with some exceptions1 27 the
general power of Congress to define and punish crimes against
the United States derives from the general delegation of power
to the Congress to "make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper" for carrying out the powers delegated to the Congress and all the powers of the United States.*
In the particular area at issue, crimes arising under a treaty,
the Constitution provides that the Congress shall have power:
"To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the
high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations ....

".*

The

explicit delegation to the Congress of power to define and punish
"Offenses against the Law of Nations" certainly includes the
areas under discussion here,130 but equally as certainly the particular delegation in this instance is no more "exclusive" than
it is in the normal case in which a particular legislative power
is delegated to the Congress. Domestic law in these areas is
usually supplied by act of Congress, but, if the supremacy clause
of article VI is to have any meaning in the federal sphere, that
clause must mean that domestic law for these areas may also be
created through use of the treaty power.
As to the third argument, namely that despite the lack of
clarity on the point in the Constitution it has become clear
through practice that criminal law may be made only by statute,
125. See part III(A) supra.
126. See part III(B) supra.
127. Particular power to punish crimes is given to the Congress in article
I, § 8, as regards "counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United
States," and in article III, § 3, as regards treason.
128. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
129. Ibid.
130. See part I supra.
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the crux of the argument is that years of failure to do otherwise
have established this rule as a binding gloss upon the Constitution.
It may be admitted that the precedents already discussed,
namely those relating to the liquor treaties and to the definition
of "Indian country,"' are distinguishable on their facts from
a true assertion of power to create criminal law by self-executing
treaty. The conclusion sought to be drawnl32 in these circumstances need not be accepted, however; the absence of practice
does not demonstrate the absence of power. The Constitution
as a whole, and the treaty power in particular, were intended
to serve the changing needs of the nation over the centuries, and
this end would be defeated if the mere failure to exercise constitutional powers to their fullest resulted in their loss on the
theory that "practice" had become "settled."
Early practice discloses several instances in which individuals
were prosecuted for crimes not founded on an act of Congress,
but the net result of this early practice is far from clear. The
earliest cases arose out of the Washington government's concern
to remain neutral in the 1793 hostilities between Great Britain
and France. 3 3 Washington's Neutrality Proclamation of April
29, 1793,"' was followed by efforts to prosecute individuals for
acts in violation of the neutrality policy, construed to be acts
in violation of the law of nations and of the treaties and laws
of the United States. No federal criminal statutes existed
punishing acts in violation of neutrality, hence the prosecutions
presented the following questions: "Could a person who violated
the law of nations or the provisions of a treaty be punishable
criminally in the Federal Courts? Did the common law afford
a basis for a criminal indictment in these Courts?"' These
questions were answered affirmatively in charges to juries that
the law of nations requires that a citizen of the United States
is "bound to keep the peace in regard to all nations with whom
we are at peace"; 3 6 that:
131. See part IIM(D) 1 supra.
182. Nathanson, supra note 115, at 868-65, states that "any attempt to
establish domestic criminal law by treaty at this late date carries the heavy
burden of upsetting a practical construction of government gradually developed as a viable compromise between possible extremes."
133. See 1 WARRnEN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY
105-23 (1922).
134. See id. at 105.
135. Id. at 112.
186. Judge Wilson's charge to the jury, as quoted in 1 WARREN, op. cit.
supra note 133, at 114.
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The peace, prosperity, and reputation of the United States, will
always greatly depend on their fidelity to their [treaty] engagements;
and every virtuous citizen (for every citizen is a party to them) will
concur in observing and executing them with honor and good faith
.137

and that:
a citizen, who in our state of neutrality, and without the authority
of the nation, takes an hostile part with either of the belligerent powers,
violates thereby his duty and the laws of his country ....38

The prosecutions failed, however, as the juries were unwilling
to convict defendants who had violated neutrality principles
for the purpose of aiding France against Great Britain, and the
question of the constitutionality of prosecutions for international
law crimes or for treaty crimes did not reach the appellate courts.
The early neutrality prosecutions demonstrate that the Washington government, and some judges, including Mr. Chief Justice
Jay and several justices of the Supreme Court 39 considered that
acts may be made criminal by treaties or by the law of nations
and punished in the federal courts even though Congress had
not by statute made the acts crimes against the United States.
At least one state court case,140 arising prior to the adoption of
the Constitution, resulted in the conviction of an individual for
an act considered criminal under international law even though
no statute had made the act a crime. In that case, the defendant
was charged with assault upon an ambassador "in violation of the
laws of nations, against the peace and dignity of the United
States and of the commonwealth of Pennsylvania." The Court
considered that the case "must be determined on the principles
of the law of nations, which form a part of the municipal laws
of Pennsylvania; and if the offenses charged in the indictment
have been committed, there can be no doubt that those laws
have been violated."' 4 '
There was little or no opportunity for a similar practice to
develop in other areas of importance at the time, however, be137. Chief Justice Jay's charge to a grand jury, as quoted in WHARTON,
UNITE STATEs 52-59 (1849).
188. Judge Wilson's charge to a grand jury, as quoted in WHARToN, op. cit.
supra note 137, at 60-65.
139. See 1 WARREN, op. cit. supra note 133, at 433, noting that in the
early years of the Court, Chief Justices Jay and Ellsworth, and Judges Cushing, Iredell, Wilson, Paterson, and Washington had each expressed the view
that "United States Courts had jurisdiction to try persons indicted for offenses,
criminal at common law but not made criminal by any specific Federal statute."
140. Respublica v. Longehamps, I U.S. (1 Dall.) 111 (Penn. Sup. Ct. 1784).
141. Id. at 113.
STATE TRIALS OF THE
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cause Congress began to adopt criminal statutes punishing acts
that might have been regarded as in violation of international
law, and prosecutions were founded on the new acts of Congress, rather than on international law.
One example is piracy. Piracy was made a crime against the
United States by an act of Congress adopted in 1790, which
prescribed the death penalty for persons convicted of "any
piracy or robbery ... upon the high sea . . . ." The act defined
"piracy" in part as any "murder or robbery" committed on the
high seas by any person, or as a crime committed by "any captain or mariner of any ship . . . [who] shall piratically and
feloniously run away with such ship ... or any goods or merchandise to the value of fifty dollars . . . ."42

The current statutory crime of piracy invokes the "law of
nations" for its definition. The statute provides as follows:
"Whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or
found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life." 4 The
earliest version of the present piracy statute was attacked as
being unconstitutionally vague in its definition of the crime,
but the Supreme Court held in 1820 that the law of nations defined piracy with reasonable certainty. 4 4 Mr. Justice Story,
writing for the Court, said:
What the law of nations on this subject is, may be ascertained by consulting the works of jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by
the general usage and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions recognising and enforcing that law. There is scarcely a writer on the
law of nations, who does not allude to piracy, as a crime of a settled
and determinate nature; and whatever may be the diversity of definitions, in other respects, all writers concur, in holding, that robbery,
45
or forcible depredations upon the sea, anino furandi, is piracy.

The statutory punishment of piracy therefore left the prosecutions for violation of the neutrality policies as the only instances in which a pressing need for government control over
individual action led to prosecution for international law crimes
or for treaty crimes. The failure of the Government to prosecute
on these theories in other areas therefore ought not to be construed as having been based on an understanding that there
may be no federal criminal prosecution for acts not made criminal
by a statute of the United States.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Act of April So, 1790, ch. IX, §§ 8-9, 1 Stat. 118.
18 U.S.C. § 1651 (1958).
United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153.
Id. at 160-61.
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An analogous question was raised by the early practice of the
federal courts of entertaining indictments founded on the common law, a practice that aroused a good deal of popular opposition.?" In 1806, a series of criminal indictments under the common law were found against Federalist spokesmen for libelous
attacks on President Jefferson and on the Congress. Jefferson
ordered the indictments dismissed, but one case' 4 7 based on such
an indictment was argued in the lower courts and reached the
Supreme Court in 1812, presenting the question of whether the
federal courts had jurisdiction to hear prosecutions based on
common law crimes. The Attorney General declined to argue the
case due to the view then taken by the Government, and no
counsel appeared for the defendants. In writing for the Court,
Mr. Justice Johnson stated:
Although this question is brought up now for the first time to be
decided by this Court, we consider it as having been long since settled in public opinion. In no other case for many years has this jurisdiction been asserted; and the general acquiescence of legal men shews
48
the prevalence of opinion in favor of the negative of the proposition.s

The Court viewed the case as turning on the extent to which
Congress had in fact given criminal jurisdiction to the federal
courts, rather than on the extent to which Congress might give
such jurisdiction should it so choose. The Court's opinion states:
It is not necessary to inquire whether the general Government, in
any and what extent, possesses the power of conferring on its Courts
a jurisdiction in cases similar to the present; it is enough that such
jurisdiction has not been conferred by any legislative act, if it does
not result to those courts as a consequence of their creation.
[T]he power which congress possess to create Courts of inferior
...
jurisdiction, necessarily implies the power to limit the jurisdiction of
those courts to particular objects . . . .14

The result reached by the Court is a holding that the federal
courts had been given no power by the Congress, and had no

implied power under the Constitution, to exercise common law
criminal jurisdiction. As Mr. Justice Johnson put it in a much
quoted sentence, for an act to be punished as a crime in a United
146. See 1 WARREN, op. cit. supra note 183, at 433-42; 2 CROSSKEY, POIlUNEED STATES 767-84
(1953). Common law crimes were punished in some state courts, however, and
some states still recognize common law crimes where not foreclosed by statute.
See 1 ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRuxMNAL LAW AND PRocEDuRE § 14 (1957).
147. United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
148. Ibid.
149. Id. at 33.
TICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE
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States court, the "legislative authority of the Union must first
make ...

[the] act a crime, affix a punishment to it, and declare

the court that shall have jurisdiction of the offence."'"0
The Supreme Court's 1812 view was in essence a construction
of the Judiciary Act of 1789,"'l which set up the inferior federal
courts and defined their jurisdiction. It was therefore a holding
that Congress had excluded common law crimes from the jurisdiction of the federal courts, rather than a holding that under
the Constitution there may be no federal common law crimes.
Even as a narrow holding on the meaning of the Judiciary
Act, the Court's 1812 opinion may well have been in error, however. Subsequent research'52 has shown that the original draft
of the Judiciary Act would have given the federal district courts
"cognizance of all crimes and offences that shall be cognizable
under the authority of the United States and defined by the
laws of the same." The italicized words would have made it clear
that the act was intended to confine criminal jurisdiction to
crimes specifically defined by Congress. The italicized words were
stricken out by an amendment in the Senate, however, which, a
leading scholar concludes, must have meant "that Congress did
not intend to limit criminal jurisdiction to crimes specifically
defined by it." 5 3
Whatever may be the truth as to the accuracy of the Court's
reading of the intent of Congress in adopting the Judiciary Act
of 1789, it seems clear that the Court's 1812 holding did not
decide the constitutional questions as to the existence of federal
common law crimes or as to the scope of the judicial power if
Congress were to permit the federal courts to hear cases based
on common law crimes. A clear constitutional holding on either
of these points might imply that the same rule ought to apply
to the question of creating domestic criminal law by selfexecuting treaty. Certainly if common law crimes may be
punished in the federal courts there should be no constitutional
barrier to punishing treaty crimes in the federal courts as well.
If, on the other hand, the Constitution is to be read as prohibiting punishment for federal common law crimes, this result
150. Id. at 34. The Hudson case was followed in United States v. Coolidge,
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415 (1816), which is interpreted as having finally settled
the question of federal common law jurisdiction. See United States v. Eaton,
144 U.S. 677, 687 (1892); 1 WARREN,
op. cit. supra note 183, at 433.
151. 1 Stat. 73.
152. Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of
1789, 37 HARv. L. REV. 49 (1923).

153. Id. at 73.
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would probably be derived from the character of the federal
government as one of delegated powers and from the conclusion
that therefore acts ought not to be punished as crimes against
the United States unless Congress has made them criminal
under the powers delegated to it by the Constitution. The common law crime doctrine may therefore extend to prohibiting
punishment for treaty crimes unless they have been incorporated
into a statute. Treaties are concluded pursuant to delegated
powers, and, under article VI of the Constitution, treaties are
made legislative acts having domestic effect, but treaties are
legislative acts in which the House of Representatives, the
branch of the Congress that is closest to the people, does not
participate. For this reason it may be argued that treaties ought
not to result in the criminal punishment of individuals unless
the treaty crimes have been incorporated into an act of Congress."' As persuasive as this argument may be from the point
of view of the need to secure the political acceptability of crimes
defined by treaty, the argument has no direct foundation in the
terms of the Constitution, and the result is not a necessary
consequence of the view that punishment for federal common
law crimes would violate the Constitution. Unlike common law
crimes, treaties are provided for in the Constitution, and, where
the problem solved by the treaty is within the scope of the treaty
power under the Constitution, 5 5 treaties are specifically given
domestic "Law of the Land" effect without limitation as to subject matter.
There remains the problem of including specific punishment
provisions in the treaty. Courts in the United States are not accustomed to fashioning their own penalties for crimes, and, even
though it might not be unconstitutional to leave the penalty up
to the court, 5 6 it would be advisable to include a specific range
of penalties in the treaty whenever criminal provisions are intended to be self-executing.
Would the definition of criminal penalties by treaty be unconstitutional? No cases have been found in which a criminal punish154. See Nathanson, supra note 115, at 865-66.
155. See part II(A) supra.
156. See the language quote in note 120 supra from the court's opinion in
the United States v. Kearney, 2 Extraterr. Cas. 665 (1923). It is questionable,
however, whether providing the court with no penalty guidelines would not be
held to violate due process. The due process standard striking down, "vague
and indefinite" statutes for failure "to give fair notice of what acts will be
punished," see, e.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 509-10 (1948), apparently has not been extended to require fair notice as to the extent of the
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ment has been defined in a treaty to have domestic effect within
the United States,"5 no doubt because United States practice
has been to leave implementation of treaty provisions to the
Congress insofar as criminal punishment may be necessary. " One
commentator has expressed the view, however, that:
So far as penalties are concerned, treaties do not carry provisions
for the punishment of treaty violations. It would be quite inappropriate for governments to stipulate what penalties should be imposed
upon their respective nationals within their own jurisdiction for treaty
violations.'6 9

This view expresses an opinion as to the wisdom of providing
punishments in treaty provisions rather than in congressional
legislation, and not an opinion as to the constitutionality of such
a practice. If, as has been argued, the Constitution would permit
the definition of crime by self-executing treaty, no additional
constitutional problems would be presented by defining the
punishment in the treaty as well, so long as the eighth amendment provisions barring "excessive fines" and "cruel and unusual
punishments" were observed. 60
E.

ACCESS TO UNITED STATES COURTS BY TREATY

The "judicial power" of the United States is dealt with in
article III of the Constitution, which provides that the judicial
power extends to "all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
. and that the judicial power is vested "in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish." The Supreme Court therefore is established directly by article III, but the establishment
punishment. The eighth amendment prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishments" has been held to place an upper limit on punishment in terms of the
seriousness of the offense, but would probably not condemn provisions giving
the courts a wide range of discretion as to punishment. See Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, S39-40 (1892)
(Field, J., dissenting).
157. See the exceptional cases discussed in note 120 supra.
158. See the discussion in part III(D) I supra.
159. Anderson, Treaties as Domestic Law, 29 Am. J. INT'L L. 472, 475
(1985).
160. The eighth amendment to the Constitution provides: "Excessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." See note 156 supra. The punishment problem might also be
handled by the enactment of a federal statute providing specific penalties for
acts made criminal by the disarmament agreement.
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of inferior federal courts depends upon action by the Congress.'o'
Article I, section 8, gives the Congress the specific power to
"constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court."
Article III gives the Supreme Court original jurisdiction in
"Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls," and appellate jurisdiction in all other cases within the
judicial power, but gives to Congress the power of defining the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction in these other cases,
"with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make." No provision is made in the Constitution for
the jurisdiction of the "inferior Courts" to be established by
the Congress under articles I and III, with the result that the
jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts is wholly defined by

the Congress.162
It is clear from the language of article III that cases arising
under treaties concluded by the United States are within the
judicial power of the United States, and that Congress might
constitutionally include such cases in the original jurisdiction of
the inferior federal courts and in the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court. Existing federal legislation in fact gives the
United States district courts original jurisdiction of "all civil
actions wherein the matter in controversy . . . arises under the

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."6 3 The
parallel statutory provision giving the district courts general
criminal jurisdiction is limited, however, to "original jurisdiction
...

of all offenses against the laws of the United States.""'

161. See 1 SCHwARTz, A CO1MMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNrTED STATES 327-30 (1963). Mr. Justice Story argued to the contrary in
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 331-32 (1816). His argument was that the language of article III, that the "judicial power of the
United States shall be vested," requires "that congress are bound to create
some inferior courts, in which to vest all that jurisdiction which, under the
constitution, is exclusively vested in the United States, and of which the supreme court cannot take original cognizance." And see Eisentrager v. Forrestal,
174 F.2d 961, 966 (D.C. Cir. 1949), in which Judge Prettyman read Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, supra, as meaning that article III was "compulsory upon
Congress to confer the whole of the federal judicial power upon some federal
court."
162. See 1 ScmyARTz, op. cit. supra note 161, at 850-59.
163. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1958). The amount in controversy must exceed
$10,000, exclusive of interest and costs.
164. 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (1958). The criminal jurisdiction of the district
courts is exclusive in the sense that offenses against the United States may
not be tried in state courts. Civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws,
or treaties of the United States may normally be brought in state courts as
well as in the federal courts.
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If a disarmament treaty were to give to international disarmament organization officials some authority, however limited,
to seek injunctive relief or criminal punishment as a means of
enforcing duties placed directly upon individuals within the
United States by the disarmament treaty,"' there is no doubt
that such cases would be "Cases .

.

. arising under .

.

. Treaties"

within the meaning of article III, and that therefore Congress
could constitutionally provide that the United States district
courts shall have jurisdiction of all such cases. May the same
result be accomplished by self-executing treaty?
The judicial power provisions of article III quoted above
might be thought to pose serious constitutional barriers to the
creation by a disarmament treaty of new tribunals without
action by the Congress, and to the vesting in these non-article
III tribunals of some part of the judicial power of the United
States."oo Analogies would be available in the congressional
practice of creating so-called legislative courts, and in certain
exceptional treaty situations,1' 7 but these analogies might be
held inapposite, and for this and other reasons, a separate treaty
court system might be regarded as unconstitutional. A different
question is presented here, however. Here we are considering
only whether the treaty power might constitutionally be used
to give to tribunals already established by the Congress a new
class of cases, some part of which may fall outside of the existing
statutory jurisdiction of the federal courts, but all of which
clearly falls within the judicial power of the United States as
defined in the Constitution. United States treaty practice provides no clear answer to this question.
Insofar as civil actions arising under treaties are concerned,
the question has not arisen because the general jurisdictional
statute quoted above has been held to give the federal district
courts jurisdiction whenever the "correct decision" of a case
depends upon a construction of a treaty of the United States.'
In this sense, therefore, if the plaintiff demonstrates that "some
right, title, privilege or immunity dependent upon the treaty is
set up or claimed so as to require the Court to apply, construe
or pass upon the treaty in determining the right asserted,"' 9
165. See part III(C) supa.
166. See HENKIN, Amnns CONTROL AND INSPECTION IN AMIERICAN LAW 19252 (1958); Nathanson, supra note 115, at 369-78.
167. See note 120 supra.
168. See Hidalgo County Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 7 v.
Hedrick, 226 F.2d 1, 6 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 983 (1956).
169. Ibid.
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then the federal courts have jurisdiction under existing federal
statutes. So also, if a treaty purports to give a "right of action"
to individuals, the right of action may be implemented by suit
in the federal courts, which have jurisdiction of the case as one
that "arises under the .

.

. treaties of the United States." 7 0

The existence of the general jurisdictional statute is not a
complete answer, however. That statute requires that the matter
in controversy exceed "the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of
interest and costs," as well as that it arise under a treaty of the
United States. Plainly the jurisdictional amount might not be
satisfied in all cases sought to be brought under the treaty.''
Criminal actions would pose an even greater problem. As has
been noted, the jurisdictional statute in criminal matters extends
only to "all offenses against the laws of the United States" in
line with the prevailing philosophy that there are no federal
common law crimes and that criminal law cannot be created
by treaty without incorporation in an act of Congress. Leaving
aside the question of delegating the power to prosecute to international officials, mentioned earlier,' 72 and the question of
creating criminal law by treaty, discussed in the preceding
section, there remains the question of enlarging by treaty the
jurisdiction of the federal district courts to hear criminal actions
brought directly under the treaty.
As was developed in the preceding section, this question, and
all questions of the scope of the power to legislate by self170. See Seth v. British Overseas Airways Corp., 829 F.2d 802, 305 (1st
Cir. 1964), where the court held that an airline passenger on an international
flight may sue in United States courts under the International Air Transportation (Warsaw) Convention, Oct. 12, 1929, art. 30(3), 49 Stat. 3021, T.S. No.
876, which provides that in cases of transportation by successive carriers, the
passenger "shall have a right of action against the last carrier." The court's
holding is a construction of 28 U.S.C. § 1881(a) (1958), quoted in the text
accompanying note 168 supra, rather than a holding that access to United
States courts had resulted directly from the treaty. See also International
Refugee Organization v. Republic S.S. Corp., 189 F.2d 858, 861 (4th Cir. 1951),
discussed in note 77 supra, where the court held that 28 U.S.C. § 1831(a)
(1958) gave the federal courts jurisdiction over suits brought by an international organization established by a treaty to which the United States is a
party, basing its holding on Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 788 (1824).
171. The usual case in which international officials seek an injunction, for
example, is unlikely always to involve a matter in controversy exceeding
$10,000 exclusive of interest and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1958). In
injunction cases the amount in controversy is measured by the "value of the
right to be protected or the extent of the injury to be prevented." WRIGHT,
FEDERAL CouRTs 98 (1963).
172. See part III(C) &upra.
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executing treaty, ought to be approached by asking whether
any specific provision of the Constitution would stand in the
way. Article III might bar the creation of new courts by treaty
because article III vests the judicial power only in the Supreme
Court and "in such inferior Courts as the Congress may . . .
establish" (emphasis supplied), but no such exclusive language
is attached to the power of the Congress to limit or define the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court." 3
The power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of the lower
federal courts is derived from the general power to establish
"inferior" courts, and is not explicitly stated in the Constitution.
As to the Supreme Court, article III directly vests appellate
jurisdiction in that court of all cases to which the judicial power
extends, subject only to the stated power of the Congress to
make "Exceptions" and "Regulations" limiting that jurisdiction.
There would, therefore, appear to be no reason to hold that
a self-executing treaty provision may not extend the original
jurisdiction of the lower federal courts, and the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, to all cases arising under a disarmament treaty, even though such a rule might alter the statutory
arrangements made by the Congress. Whatever might be the
position if Congress thereafter sought by statute to avoid this
result by excluding all cases, or criminal cases, arising under the
disarmament treaty from the original jurisdiction of the inferior
federal courts and from the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, 74 the initial vesting of such jurisdiction pursuant to the
treaty, and within the bounds set for the judicial power by
article III, would be nothing more than the normal result of a
self-executing treaty provision within the meaning of the supremacy clause of article VI.

F.

DELEGATION OF RULEMAKING POWER TO AN INTERNATIONAL
DISARMAMENT ORGANIZATION
At several points in the preceding discussion it was suggested

that in addition to including self-executing rules and remedies in
the disarmament treaty, it may prove desirable to delegate some
measure of rulemaking power to the international disarmament
organization established under the treaty. If implementation of
the treaty within the territory of each party is to be left to the
national governments concerned, which would adopt legislation
173. See the discussion at the beginning of this section and part III(D)
1 supra.
174. See part IV infra.
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in fulfillment of obligations assumed in the agreement, it may
be necessary to give the international disarmament organization
power to interpret the treaty obligations, or to legislate new
international obligations in limited areas, but it would not be
necessary to give the international organization power to make
rules having self-executing effect within the territory of the
states concerned.' 7 If, however, self-executing effect is to be
given to rules and remedies contained in the treaty in order to
provide for direct national enforcement of treaty obligations
against individuals, it may be necessary to adopt the same
principle for interpretations of the treaty rules by the international organization, or for additional rules that the organization
found to be needed in order to implement the agreement.7'e National governments would of course be reluctant to give up rulemaking power of this kind to an international organization, but
it is not beyond the realm of the possible that governments will
recognize that certain kinds of problems will have to be resolved
directly at the international level without seeking ratification
according to the constitutional processes of each member of the
disarmament organization.
The type of rulemaking power under discussion here would
be power to interpret, or to expand upon, the substantive rules
contained in the disarmament agreement, or to formulate regulations for designated areas or problems according to standards
laid down in the agreement, or to fulfill a particular policy defined by the agreement. Violation of the regulations issued by
the international disarmament organization might be enjoined
or punished by actions brought in United States courts in the
same manner as would be provided for violations of the substantive rules contained in the treaty. It is not contemplated,
however, that the international organization would be given
power either to prescribe penalties for violations of the rules or
regulations, or to try or otherwise to determine the guilt or innocence of individuals charged with violations. 7 7
175. See parts I, 11 supra.
176. If enforcement is to rest on some combination of national action and
of international action through national law enforcement institutions, and if
no provision is made to permit the international organization to modify those
portions of the enforcement scheme entrusted to it, there would be a danger
that the purpose of the system could be defeated by changes in the national
legal framework undertaken for that purpose. One example might be the development of new sources of power with possible military application, as to
which the international organization ought to have the same type of regulatory function as it is given over existing power sources.
177. See parts III(C), III(E) supra. 1 DAvis, AD1MINISTRATIVE LAw
TREATISE § 2.13, at 133 (1958), comments:
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Accepting the possible need for delegating some measure of
self-executing rulemaking power to an international disarmament
organization, would such a treaty provision be consistent with
the Constitution? No precedents are availablet 7 s but the question presented is essentially the same as that presented within
the United States by the delegation of legislative power to an
executive agency or to an independent regulatory commission.
If it would be appropriate and within the treaty power to make
domestic law, and to provide domestic remedies, by self-executing
One kind of power of adjudication which clearly cannot be conferred upon an administrative agency is the power to determine guilt
or innocence in criminal cases. The reason is that the criminal defendant is entitled to special procedural protection of the kind that is
given neither in civil proceedings in court nor in administrative proceedings.
178. A 1953 decision of the Federal Communications Commission may
be read as giving self-executing effect pursuant to an act of Congress to
interpretations made by the Executive Directors of the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD or Bank) and of the International Monetary Fund (IMF or Fund) of a term contained in the treaties
establishing each of these international organizations. IBRD v. All American
Cables & Radio, Inc., 8 PIE & FIscHER, RADIo REGULATION 927 (FCC 1953).
Each of the treaties involved provides that the official communications of the
organization "shall be accorded by each member the same treatment that it
accords to the official communications of other members." Articles of Agreement of the IBRD (Bank Agreement), Dec. 27, 1945, art. VII, sec. 7, 60 Stat.
1458, T.I.A.S. No. 1502; Articles of Agreement of the IMF (Fund Agreement),
Dec. 27, 1945, art. IX, see. 7, 60 Stat. 1414, T.I.A.S. No. 1501. Each treaty
also provides that questions of interpretation of the provisions of the Agreement "shall be submitted to the Executive Directors for their decision," which
is final subject to appeal to the Board of Governors of the organization.
Article IX of the Bank Agreement, 60 Stat. 1460, and article XVIII of the
Fund Agreement, 60 Stat. 1423. Pursuant to these sections the Executive
Directors were asked in 1950 to decide whether the word "treatment" applied
to rates charged for transmission of the official communications of the Bank
and of the Fund, a question which the Executive Directors answered in the
affirmative without dissent, and from which decision no appeal was taken to
the respective Boards of Governors. Against this background the FCC decided
that the question had been "conclusively determined" by the decision of the
Executive Directors of the Bank and the Fund, and that this decision bound
the United States and must be put into effect by the FCC. 8 PE & FiscEn,
op. cit. supra, at 944, 951. The FCC pointed out, however, that the relevant
provisions of article VII of the Bank Agreement and of article IX of the Fund
Agreement had been explicitly given "full force and effect in the United
States" by § 11 of the Bretton Woods Agreements Act, 59 Stat. 516 (1945),
22 U.S.C. § 286h (1958), and that by §§ 12 and 13 of that act, 59 Stat. 516
(1945), 22 U.S.C. §§ 286ij (1958), Congress had recognized the binding authority of decisions by the Executive Directors under the respective articles of
agreement. The FCC therefore concluded that although the rate privilege of
the Bank and Fund is "enforceable without further legislative action," the case
does not present the question of "whether an executive agreement or treaty
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treaty in the disarmament area, this would amount to an exercise
of legislative power by treaty that would be equivalent to an
exercise of legislative power by Congress, and the same considerations should govern the delegation of this power by treaty
to an international disarmament organization as would govern
the delegation of a similar legislative power of the Congress to
an agency of the executive.7'o So long as the implementation is
accomplished through United States courts, no additional problems should be presented simply because the delegation is to
international rather than to national officials.s 0 In both cases
other requirements of the Constitution would be observed and
Congress would retain ultimate control, or a veto, over what is
sought to be done as domestic law pursuant to the delegation of
legislative power, so that the only constitutional question would
be the extent to which the legislative power in question may be
delegated.'si
The Supreme Court has in the past frequently said that "the
legislative power of Congress cannot be delegated";' 82 yet, as
is self-executing or requires domestic legislative implementation." 8 P= &
FIscHER, op. cit. supra, at 950. The Bretton Woods Agreements Act, as construed by the FCC, means at least that Congress has accepted a process
whereby the meaning and application of treaty rules would be decided with
finality for international law purposes by the international organization concerned, and that the decision of the international organization would have
immediate effect within the United States as part of United States domestic
law. The result in this case, therefore, is derived from the delegation of this
form of legislative power to an international organization by act of Congress,
rather than by treaty. The author is indebted to Louis B. Sohn for drawing
attention to this decision. See also Hexner, Interpretation by Public International Organizationsof Their Basic Instruments, 53Am. J. INTL L. 341, 35456 (1959).
179. See Nathanson, The Constitution and World Government, 57 Nw.
U.L. REv. 855, 366-69 (1962). In discussing the Clark and Sohn proposals,
Nathanson notes that the General Assembly as revised by Clark and Sohn
would have power to define obligations and offenses applicable to individuals,
and to determine punishments. Thus, he concludes, "essentially the same
constitutional problem would be presented as that presented by delegations
of legislative power." Id. at 367.
180. HENKIN, ARms CoNTRoL ANm INSPECTION IN AMERICAN LAw 114-16
(1958), notes that it might be argued that delegations of power under the Constitution may be made only to "United States officials, appointed by the President, confirmed by the Senate, and taking an oath to support the United
States Constitution." Id. at 115. Yet, he points out, many acts are now done
on behalf of the United States by persons not officers of the United States,
and therefore "No definite conclusion is possible." Ibid.
181. See the discussion in part IV infra.
182. United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 85
(1932).
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observed by Davis, a leading authority on administrative law,
"the Supreme Court has specifically upheld scores of delegations
of legislative power, and no congressional delegation to a regularly constituted administrative agency has ever been held invalid."8 s Davis also observes:
The non-delegation doctrine is wholly judge-made. The Constitution provides merely: "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States . . . ." The power is also

granted "to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers." Some congressional
powers must obviously be delegated, including the powers "to . . .
collect taxes," "to borrow Money," "to coin Money," and "to raise
and support Armies." Delegation was not discussed at the Constitutional Convention, except that a motion by Madison that the President be given power "to execute such other powers . . . as may from
time to time be delegated by the national Legislature" was defeated
as unnecessary.' 84

Adequate standards may still be a problem. It is sometimes
said that legislative power may not be delegated unless "standards" are set for the guidance of the administrative agency,8 5
but delegations have been upheld where the only standard set is
the "public convenience, interest, or necessity,"'
or "unfair
methods of competition,"' 8 7 and in some cases delegations have
been upheld where no standard is set at all. Davis concludes that
in the final analysis delegation is a problem "of determining what
organs of the government are best qualified to determine particular policies," and that this question frequently "is not simply
whether the policies should be framed by the agency or by Congress but whether the policies initiated by the agency should
become effective with or without running the legislative gauntlet." 8 8
In the foreign affairs field, cases exist in which legislative
powers have been delegated by act of Congress to the executive,
183. 1 DAvis, op. cit. supra note 177, § 2.02, at 77. Only two delegations to
public authorities have been held unconstitutional, and neither "was to a
regularly constituted administrative agency which followed an established
procedure designed to afford the customary safeguards to affected parties." Id.
§ 2.01, at 76.
184. Id. § 2.02, at 79. (Footnotes omitted.)
185. See, e.g., the cases quoted by 1 DAvis, op. cit. supra note 177, § 2.04.
186. Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289

U.S. 266 (1933).
187. FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920).
188. 1 DAVIs, op. cit. supra note 177, § 2.16, at 153. Davis notes that policies written into regulatory statutes "usually emanate in part from the agency
concerned. . . ." Ibid.
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but no case has been found in which similar powers have been
delegated by treaty to an international organization.1so Henkin
points out, for example, that:
The regulations of existing international bodies do not control or directly affect the rights and interests of individuals in the United States.
In some instances ... this is so because the United States Government
stands between the international body and the American citizen and
itself determines whether it will make a regulation proposed by the
international body applicable in the United States. Or, in other
instances, the character of the regulation is such that it applies to the
action of the Government of the United States, not to the actions of
private persons. 90

The evidence cited by Henkin amply demonstrates that there
has been no willingness in the history of the United States to
delegate to international agencies legislative functions that fall
within the scope of the treaty power, but in this, as in other
areas, that fact alone ought not to imply that delegations of
treaty powers would be unconstitutional. Early writers, drawing
on the then settled doctrine that legislative powers may not be
delegated, concluded that for the same reasons treaty powers
may not be delegated.' 9 ' To the extent, therefore, that the non189. For a possible case of delegation of legislative power to an international organization by act of Congress, see IBRD v. All America Cables &
Radio, Inc., 8 PE & Fiscm, RADIo REGuLATIoN 927 (FCC 1953), discussed
in note 178 supra.For a case of delegation of legislative power to the President
by act of Congress, see, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
299 U.S. 804 (1936), in which the Court upheld a delegation to the President
of power to make regulations controlling the sale of arms to any country
engaged in an armed conflict. The Court stated, id. at 319-20:
It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not alone
with an authority vested in the President by an exertion of legislative
power, but with such an authority plus the very delicate, plenary and
exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations-a power which does not
require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress, but which, of
course, like every other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution. It is quite
apparent that if, in the maintenance of our international relations, embarrassment -perhaps serious embarrassment- is to be avoided and
success for our aims achieved, congressional legislation which is to be
made effective through negotiation and inquiry within the international
field must often accord to the President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were
domestic affairs alone involved.
190. HENKIN, supra note 180, at 109. (Footnotes omitted.) Compare the
FCC decision in IBRD v. All America Cables &Radio, Inc., supra note 189.
191. See, e.g., CanDuAL, TREATIES: THEm IVAAING AND ENFORCEMENT
119-20 (2d ed. 1916). Nathanson, supra note 179, at 369, concludes that "even
if the treaty power itself includes the power to create new criminal offenses,
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delegability doctrine has given way to delegability subject to
the tests suggested by Davis, the same criteria should apply to
delegations by treaty. As noted above,'19 2 the fact that the delegation is by treaty to an international organization, rather than
by statute to a domestic agency, should make no difference as
the nature of the powers delegated is the same in both cases,
and as it is here assumed that the self-executing character of
the rules made would present no constitutional difficulties under
the treaty power.
Even granting all that has been said, however, the problems
involved in any delegation of legislative power may not be
simple, and the final answer has not been given. Davis observes,
for example, that:
Delegation is only a means to an end. The non-delegation doctrine
has been to a considerable extent a judge-made corollary of laissezfaire, inconsistent with positive government. If comprehensive regulation can succeed only through broad delegation, the handiest judicial
weapon to kill such regulation is often the non-delegation doctrine.
The ultimate determination of desirable boundaries for delegation must
therefore depend in part upon conceptions about the proper role of
government in society.19 3

In becoming party to a general and complete disarmament agreement, the President and the Senate would be speaking for the
people of the United States and giving their view of the proper
scope of international governmental authority, and that expression ought to be given great weight by national courts. There
can be no guarantee, however, that the national courts will
produce the most appropriate rule from the world point of
view, and it would therefore be useful to settle the point by
amendment of the Constitution.
IV. THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO NULLIFY THE
DOMESTIC LAW EFFECT OF TREATIES
The assumption up to this point has been that, where necessary, Congress would enact legislation to implement United
States obligations under the disarmament agreement, that such
legislation would be kept in force as required by the agreement,
and that, where particular provisions of the agreement would
be self-executing under United States law, Congress would not
there is at least a serious constitutional doubt as to whether such power might
constitutionally be delegated to an international assembly in the manner provided for in" the Clark and Sohn proposals, note 3 supra.
192. See text accompanying note 180 supra.
193. 1 DAvis, op. cit. supra note 177, § 2.16, at 157. (Footnotes omitted.)
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seek thereafter to avoid the self-executing effect of these treaty
provisions by adopting inconsistent legislation. It must be assumed that, at the outset, Congress will be ready to implement
the disarmament agreement, or at least that Congress will not
seek to prevent the internal application of the obligations of the
agreement. No agreement is likely to be entered into without
this measure of congressional support. It cannot be assumed,
however, that Congress will necessarily continue in its willingness to live with the agreement, and it is therefore important to
ask what the result would be if Congress amended or repealed
the implementing legislation, or sought to nullify by statute the
domestic effect of the self-executing treaty provisions.
Where the disarmament agreement is clear in leaving its enforcement to national legislation, and the only obligation assumed
by the United States is to adopt appropriate legislation, it would
of course be clear that amendment or repeal of that legislation
would end its application as domestic law, even though the
United States may thereby be placed in violation of its international law obligations under the treaty.
The situation is no different where a treaty provision is selfexecuting and therefore has direct domestic effect. Self-executing
treaties are made the "Law of the Land" under article VI of the

Constitution, and therefore supersede preexisting inconsistent
federal statutes, but such treaties are not given any greater
standing than federal statutes and may be superseded by a
subsequent inconsistent federal statute.*'* Article VI makes the
"laws of the United States," as well as treaties, the supreme law
of the land, and the courts have held this to mean that treaties
and statutes are on the same plane in the sense that neither is
more "supreme" than the other. As put by Hackworth, the
accepted reading of article VI is that:
Where a treaty and an act of Congress are wholly inconsistent
with each other and the two cannot be reconciled, the courts have held
that the one later in point of time must prevail. While this is necessarily true as a matter of municipal law, it does not follow, as has
sometimes been said, that a treaty is repealed or abrogated by a later
inconsistent statute. The treaty still subsists as an international obligation although it may not be enforceable by the courts or administrative authorities.' 95

The domestic or municipal law effect of treaties is of course
194. See the cases cited in 2 SCHWARTz, A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 194-26, 404 (1963); RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN
RELATIONs LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 144, at 515, comments, at 516-21,

§ 148, at 532 (Proposed Official Draft,

1962).

195. 5 HACKWORTH, INTERNATIONAL

LAW 185-86

(1943).
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what concerns us here, and, as has been said, the accepted rule
is that treaties and statutes have equal domestic effect under
article VI of the Constitution. The Supreme Court has said
that both treaties and statutes "are declared . . . to be the

supreme law of the land, and no superior efficacy is given to
either over the other."'e Treaties have been held to supersede
prior acts of Congress, and, where Congress has shown a clear
intention to do so, subsequently enacted statutes have been held
to supersede the domestic law effect of self-executing treaties.er
It is not clear on the face of article VI that the language of
the supremacy clause dictates this conclusion, however. Article
VI merely enumerates three sources of United States domestic
law, the Constitution, "the laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof," and "Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States," and
provides that each "shall be the supreme Law of the Land."
Article VI certainly implies that the Constitution is controlling,
since laws are to be made "in Pursuance" of the Constitution,
and treaties are to be made "under the Authority of the United
States" derived since 1789 from the Constitution,9 * but that
article does not in so many words stipulate that laws and treaties
shall be of equal weight. Considering this omission, and considering that treaties are legislative acts entered into by more
than one state, and increasingly by nearly all the states of the
world, 9 it has been argued that for domestic law purposes
treaties ought to be regarded as a higher type of law than
statutes, and that therefore the courts ought not to read article
VI as permitting Congress by statute to supersede a treaty as
domestic law.
This argument has been advanced by Dr. Wallace McClure
of the Rule of Law Research Center, who writes that:
. . . any consideration of treaties or other international acts should begin
with recognition that they are joint enactments and hence obligations
of the people of the United States to other peoples and of other peoples
to the people of the United States. If there is law that is binding upon
nations, international acts are equally binding under that law upon
all peoples that enter into them. In their aspect as contracts these
facts are clear: both peoples are bound; neither can withdraw without
the consent of the other; unilateral alteration would disrupt the basic
legal conception of contracts, the meeting of the minds of the parties.
196. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
197. See the authorities cited in note 194 supra; note 105 supra.
198. Treaties made prior to 1789 were intended to be reaffirmed by the
Constitution. See McCLURE, WoRLD LEGAL ORDER 42-43 (1960).
199. A general and complete disarmament treaty would necessarily have
to include all the major states of the world.

959.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:889

Is any other conclusion any less incongruous with respect to the concept of joint legislation? Can one branch of a legislature (in this case
two peoples acting in unison) undo what both have jointly enacted?
Does it not follow, inescapably, that, once accepted, treaties leave no
discretion-save as their stipulations expressly indicate-to any of
a people's servants with respect to their fulfillment? 20 0

If the result sought in concluding a general and complete
disarmament agreement will be to give that agreement selfexecuting effect within the territory of the parties, and to rely
on a combination of national and international action to enforce
the agreement through national law-enforcement institutions, it
may be regarded as inadmissible to continue the established
rule that Congress may upset the domestic effect of the treaty
arrangement. A treaty of this type would in effect lay the framework for a regime of law in world affairs, a framework that
must have the promise of stability if it is to be acceptable to
the peoples of the United States and of the world. In order to
provide the requisite stability it would be useful, and perhaps
essential, to secure a new rule in the United States on the relative position of treaties, or at least of the disarmament treaty,
and of statutes in American law.
The clearest route to the new rule would of course be by
constitutional amendment giving a special status to at least
some portions of the disarmament agreement. The present rule,
namely that as between treaties and statutes the later in time
prevails, is a judge-made rule, however, and it is at least arguable that the courts need not follow the old rule, established
in cases concerning relatively minor treaty arrangements,2 o' in
the new circumstances in which the treaty power would be used
to establish a basic world order intended to endure. United
States courts have abandoned old law when confronted by the

changed needs of the people in other cases 20 2 in which, as here,
the language of the Constitution has no clear, plain, and compelling meaning. It should not be assumed, therefore, that the
same result may not be achieved in dealing with a disarmament
agreement that is clearly intended to establish domestic law.
But, so long as there is no appeal from national court decisions
to an international court, national courts cannot be relied upon
to construct the rule most appropriate from the world view, and
200. McCLuRE, op. cit. supra note 198, at 89-40.
201. See id. at 71-104.
202. The most famous recent examples are Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954) (reversing the "separate but equal" doctrine), and Baker
v. Carr, 869 U.S. 186 (1962) (reversing the "political questions" doctrine as
applied to legislative reapportionment).

1965]

INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT

953

it would be a greater guarantee of stability to achieve the desired rule in this, as in other unsettled areas, through amendment
of the Constitution.
V. CONCLUSION
This report is primarily concerned with the constitutional
problems that would be presented by one aspect of a disarmament agreement, namely the alternative methods by which the
obligations of the agreement might be brought to bear upon
individual action by persons subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States.
Current thinking in the general and complete disarmament
area, as embodied in the official proposals advanced by the
United States and by the Soviet Union, seems to envisage that
the terms of the agreement will be applied to individuals solely
through national government action taken in fulfillment of obligations assumed in the agreement. The Soviet Plan would oblige
the states parties to the agreement to ensure its implementation
in their territories; the United States Plan calls for national legislation to impose legal obligations on individuals and to provide
appropriate penalties for noncompliance. 2 03 Neither plan would
give individuals clear obligations to look beyond the commands
of their national governments for substantive rules governing
individual conduct or for authoritative procedures to interpret
or apply the substantive rules to individual conduct. Both plans
would preserve the present framework of the international system in which treaty obligations, including the obligations of the
disarmament agreement, usually fall on states rather than on individuals, and in which the national government as a unit, rather
than the individual or some branch of the national government,
has the ultimate responsibility for carrying out the obligations
imposed by the agreement.
If nothing more is added, no substantial constitutional problems are likely to be presented by the internal enforcement
aspects of a disarmament agreement. In this light, the agreement
would not differ in kind from the ordinary case of an international agreement on a subject appropriate for international
negotiation, which was then enforced within the United States
by legislation adopted by the Congress either under its delegated
powers, or under its general power to adopt legislation that is
03. The United States Plan is quoted at note 4 supra. The Soviet Plan
is quoted in the text accompanying note 5 supra. See also the discussion in
part I supra. Compare the Clark and Sohn proposals discussed in note 8 supra.
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necessary and proper for the implementation of a treatyo
Difficulties arise, however, when it is considered that a general
and complete disarmament agreement should not only impose
the ordinary type of legal obligations on the states parties to the
agreement, but should also serve as the legal framework for a
warless world. Disarmament can succeed only if it is understood
and accepted by the governments and the peoples of the world,
but it will be accepted only if governments and peoples can have
confidence that the legal system sought to be established by
the disarmament agreement cannot easily be defeated by a
change of heart in any one government or combination of governments. The security sought through armaments will not be
abandoned to vague and formless hopes for a better world.
Seen in this light, it is doubtful that the usual means of internal implementation of treaty obligations would be regarded
as sufficient to enforce the new world legal framework to be
established by a general and complete disarmament agreement.
International procedures would no doubt be provided to meet
the extreme case in which unlawful state action threatened to
upset the disarmed world order, but the stakes in disarmament
are too great to expect governments and peoples to be willing
to place their entire reliance on ultimate sanctions of this type.
The disarmed world order would be more secure, and therefore
more acceptable, to the extent that threatening conduct can be
countered, and perhaps ended, before it solidifies into a national
pattern disruptive of the disarmament agreement.
This is the end that would be sought by placing substantive
responsibilities directly on individuals under the agreement, and
by giving enforcement powers directly to national institutions,
with perhaps some international element through the vesting in
international officials of the power to initiate enforcement procedures through national law enforcement institutions. Other
and more powerful procedures to the same end may be suggested,
such as the regional international courts and the AttorneyGeneral of the United Nations proposed by Clark and Sohn; 20s
but this report has been limited to the constitutional problems
raised by the middle ground proposals in which individual responsibility would exist, but would be enforced only through
existing national institutions.
If it is accepted that in a disarmed world individual responsibility must extend beyond the national government to embrace
204. See parts III(A), (B) supra.
205. See note 3 supra.
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the fundamentals of the world legal order,2 0 the question is presented of the extent to which the internal impact of this new
view of the international order would be consistent with the
Constitution. This question has two basic aspects that are considered in this report, namely, the source of substantive rules
applicable to individual conduct,2 07 and the use by international
officials of domestic law enforcement institutions to enforce the
individual obligations. 0
In neither of these areas is there sufficient precedent to arrive
at a firm judgment as to the constitutionality of various alternatives, but the precedents that do exist, and the interpretive approach likely to be taken if a national consensus on disarmament
is achieved, point to the conclusion that most of what might
be sought could be accomplished under the Constitution as it
now stands. United States practice includes numerous areas in
which treaties have had direct effect on individual action, and
the constitutional limits that have been thought to exist need
not be read so broadly as to impair the objective sought here.209
As to international involvement in national enforcement procedures, the precedents are even less plentiful, but nothing in constitutional theory ought to prevent international officials from
being accorded access to United States courts by statute or by
treaty for the purpose of enforcing individual obligations under
a disarmament agreement. 210
Perhaps the most serious constitutional questions are presented by the suggestions that some measure of rulemaking
authority must be delegated to an international disarmament
organization,211 and that the basic framework of rules and remedies contained in the disarmament agreement must be placed
beyond the normally accepted power of the Congress to nullify
the domestic effect of treaties by enacting inconsistent legislation 12 In each of these areas, a substantial argument might
be made that the end sought might be achieved within the
present language of the Constitution, but the argument would
be so highly disputed, and the end result so essential to the legal
framework of the disarmed world, that the most appropriate procedure would be to settle these points by amendment of the
Constitution.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
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See parts III(B), (D) supra.
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See part IV supra; McCLuRa, op. cit. supra note 198, at 71-104.

